Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Acts? by Ogune, Theo I.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 30
Number 2 Spring 2000 Article 2
2000
Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial
Zombism or Contextual Acts?
Theo I. Ogune
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ogune, Theo I. (2000) "Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Acts?," University of Baltimore Law









JUDGES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: JUDICIAL ZOMBISM OR CONTEXTUAL 
ACTIVISM? 
by Theo I. Ogune, Esq. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Case-Law Syndrome 
B. What is Statutory Construction? 
C. American Codes of Statutes 









The Theoretical Battle About 
Legislative History 
JUDICIAL PASSIVITY 
A. Brogan v. United States: A Case-note 
of Judicial Passivity 
B. Rethinking Justice Scalia's Textualist 
Approach 
CONTEXTUAL ACTIVISM 
A. The Role ofthe Judge in an Era of 
Codes 
B. Contextual Activism as a Practical-
Reasoning Alternative to Textualism 
C. The Maryland Approach as an 
Example of Contextual Activism 
CONCLUSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Joe Amicable resides in the City of Talks, where Lisa 
Low-Pride manages the federally insured Talks 
Commercial Bank. Joe is a well-liked, wealthy 
businessman, who, in addition to contributing enormously 
to the Talks economy, has always been a law-abiding 
citizen, doing all of his businesses "by the books." Joe is 
a charismatic individual whose smooth-talking ability always 
got him whatever he asked for. Some time ago, he met 
with Lisa Low-Pride to go over his application for a 
business loan. He knew that Ms. Low-Pride loved the 
pretentious side oflife. He decided, therefore, to aid his 
otherwise impeccable application by being overly polite 
to her. He told her that she was the second (to Mrs. 
Amicable, that is) most beautiful and attractive woman in 
Talks. 
Intending to influence Ms. Low-Pride's disposition 
towards the loan application, Joe disregarded the fact that 
three months prior to the meeting he had voted Ms. Low-
Pride as the least attractive woman among twenty-five 
contestants in Talks's annual beauty contest. He thought, 
however, that by now she had forgotten the beauty contest. 
He was mistaken. He also did not know about the federal 
statute that made it a crime for "anyone to knowingly make 
any false statement for the purpose of influencing in any 
way the action of an FDIC-insured bank upon any 
application for business loan." Additionally, Joe did not 
know that this offense attracted a mandatory five-year 
incarceration at the federal penitentiary, and a lifetime ban 
from loan applications. Ms. Low-Pride contacted the 
appropriate federal authorities. Joe was subsequently 
convicted, and has appealed to your court. As a judge, 
would you, under the circumstances, affirm his conviction 
and send him to prison (or ban him from seeking loans 
from banks)? Or would you excuse such flattery as not 
relevant to a loan application? Your choice, indeed, 
depends on how you interpret the statute in question. 
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Would you interpret it to prohibit such an irrelevant false 
statement? 
If you were Justice Keen of the Supreme Court of 
Newgarth in Lon Fuller's illustrative case of the Speluncean 
Explorers, you would abide by the statute's text and send 
Joe to prison for five years. I As with the Speluncean 
explorers, the language of the statute in Joe's case appears 
plain and unambiguous. Joe's situation seems to be 
covered by the statute. There is also no doubt that Joe's 
flattery of the bank manager is a false statement,2 or that 
Joe intended to influence the consideration of his loan 
application. Similar to the Speluncean explorers, Joe must 
I See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 
HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949): In the case ofthe Speluncean explorers, 
Roger Whetmore, with his fellow members of the Speluncean 
Society (an organization interested in cave-exploration), went on 
an expedition. As they explored a certain cave, the cave's entrance 
gave way and closed them in; they were trapped. They tried 
diligently to escape, but were unsuccessful. It became eventually 
apparent that they were to stay in the cave for far longer than 
they had bargained. Although a rescue team was sent after therp, 
the team failed to get them out on time. They spent 32 days in the 
cave. To avoid starving to death during those days, they killed 
and ate Roger Whetmore, who initially suggested that they resort 
to such survival tactics. Upon their rescue, they were charged 
with murder, and subsequently convicted and sentenced to hang. 
An appeal reached the highest court of the land, on which sat 
Justices Keen, Tatting, Foster, Handy, and Chief Justice 
Truepenny. The issue was the interpretation of the criminal statute, 
which read: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall 
be punished by death." Should the Court affirm the explorers' 
death sentences? Ch ief Justice Truepenny affirmed, but 
admonished the governor to commute the sentences, since the 
statute applied unfairly to this excusable situation. Justice Keen 
would simply affirm, without any consideration of the excuses, 
since the statutory text was plain. Justice Foster considered the 
statute's purpose and other extratextual factors, and voted for 
reversal. Justice Tatting chided Justice Foster for not limiting his 
decision to the text, but nevertheless abstained from deciding, 
because he found no way out of his dilemma. Justice Handy 
dwelt on public opinion, and voted for reversal. Because the 
votes were evenly divided the explorers' sentences were affirmed. 
This hypothetical naration by Professor Fuller is a classic 
illustration of the arguments surrounding the theories of statutory 
construction. 
22. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 692 (3d ed. 1990) (defining flattery as excessive, 
insincere or false praises that are often used to win favors). 
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face the five-year mandate ofthe federal statute.3 But, is 
this the right result? Does the statute actually cover all 
false statements, including those not material to the loan 
application? Is Joe's flattering statement equally a false 
statement as, say, ifhe had lied to the loan officer about 
owning a beach-front property in Ocean City, Maryland? 
What if, with a view to winning more favors, he had falsely 
bragged to her at a cocktail party that he had uncovered 
the recipe for Coke? Must he be punished because she 
happens to be the loan officer who is reviewing his loan 
application? Is it not an understatement to say that such 
irrelevant false statements, although juvenile, are not within 
the coverage of the statute in question? Yet the language 
of the statute prohibits all false statements. Indeed, this is 
precisely the debate driving the current controversy in 
statutory construction, especially in the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Like Justice Foster of Newgarth, Justice Stevens 
would reverse Joe's conviction. To Justice Stevens, such 
a federal statute does not cover all false statements; it 
covers only statements that are material to the loan 
application. Thus, the government must 'prove the 
materiality of falsehood as a separate element of the crime 
of making a punishable false statement. In contrast, Justice 
Souter, like Justice Keen of New garth, would find that 
the federal statute plainly does not require any proof of 
materiality as a separate element ofthe crime. 
In United States v. Wells,4 the issue before the 
Supreme Court was the construction of § 1014 of the 
United States Code.5 In contest was whether the federal 
3 Joe's situation is sharply different from that of the Speluncean 
explorers. I would not have reversed the explorers' sentences, 
because their act was not only atrocious, but also met any 
definition of murder one relies on. 
4 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997). 
5 See id. at 924. In Wells, the defendants were owners ofa business 
venture, which leased office copiers for a monthly fee that covered 
the use and maintenance of such copiers. See id. In an attempt to 
raise money, they assigned their financial interests in various 
lease agreements to certain banks. See id. As' part of the 
contracting process with the banks, they furnished the banks 
with false information. See id. First, they gave the banks versions 
of the lease agreements that falsely indicated that the monthly 
leasing fees they charged their customers did not include the 
30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 5 
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statute required the Government to prove separately that 
the "false statement" charged under the statute concerned 
a fact of consequence to a loan application.6 The statute's 
language was similar to that quoted in Joe's situation.7 Both 
the trial court and the intermediate court construed it as 
requiring a culpable false statement to relate to a material 
fact. 8 The Supreme Court rejected that construction.9 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, looked primarily 
to the text of the statute. 10 The text, according to him, 
copiers' maintenance costs, but that the customers were 
separately responsible for such costs. See id. According to the 
government, had the banks known that the defendants already 
charged their customers for maintenance and were responsible 
for servicing the copiers, the banks might have required the 
defendants to maintain a cash-flow reserve account. See id. In 
addition to this misrepresentation, the defendants forged their 
wives' signatures in the personal guaranties to the banks. See 
id. They were subsequently convicted for knowingly making a 
false statement to federally-insured banks. See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See 18 U.S.c. § 1014 (1976): 
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or 
report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or 
security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the 
action of the Farm Credit Administration, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation or a company the Corporation 
reinsures, the Secretary of Agriculture acting through 
the Farmers Home Administration or successor agency, 
the Rural Development Administration or successor 
agency, any Farm Credit Bank, production credit 
association, agricultural credit association, bank for 
cooperatives, or any division, officer, or employee 
thereof, or of any regional agricultural credit corporation 
established pursuant to law, or a Federal land bank, a 
Federal land bank association, a Federal Reserve bank, 
a small business investment company, a Federal credit 
union, an insured State-chartered credit union, any 
institution the accounts of which are insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ... shall be fined 
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 
30 years, or both. 
8 See Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 924-25. 
9 See id. at 925. 
10 See id. at 926-27. 
30.2 U. Bait L.F. 6 
was plain and unambiguous, and proscribed "any" false 
statement that satisfied the other elements of the statute. II 
This is especially so, Justice Souter noted, as "[ n ]owhere 
does [the statute] further say that a material fact must be 
the subject of the false statement or so much as mention 
materiality."12 
The majority's interpretation of the statute in Wells 
exposes the need for a closer look at the principles of 
statutory construction. While the holding in Wells may be 
correct in that circumstance, the Court's reading of the 
statute lacks judicial prudence. Although it is hard to argue 
that the defendants in Wells were not culpable, even with 
materiality as an element of the offense, the problem is the 
Court's approach to the statutory issue. Because the Court 
paid more attention to the statute's text than its overall 
substance and practicality, 13 Wells reasoning is flawed. 
More specifically, it shows why jurisprudential wisdom in 
statutory construction must go beyond the passive 
decipherment oflegislative grammar. 
In contrast to the majority's construction of the statute 
in Wells, Justice Stevens presented a similar hypothetical 
to Joe's situation above to show the fallacy of a hard-
nosed adherence to statutory text. 14 The issue is whether 
courts and legal practitioners ought to pay more attention 
to jurisprudential absurdity as a symptom of statutory 
ambiguity. This Article projects that viewpoint - the so-
called "golden rule" of statutory construction. Without 
such an approach, a flattery-mongering loan applicant as 
hypothetical Joe faces a five-year prison term. But, as 
Justice Stevens correctly observed in his dissenting opinion 
in Wells, ''the 'unusual' nature of trivial statements provides 
scant justification for reaching the conclusion that Congress 
intended such peccadillos to constitute a felony. "15 
II See id. 
121d. at 927. Although Justice Souter also reviewed the statute's 
history, his interpretation was driven by the text. 
13 Even the Court's discussion of the statute's legislative history, 
see id. at 928, is an inadequate attempt at justifying its 
oversimplification ofthe statutory text. 
14 See Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 938. 
151d. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
This debate between the Wells majority and Justice 
Stevens illustrates the main controversy in statutory 
construction. While some argue that courts should limit 
the consideration of a statute to the statute's text, 16 others 
advocate the employment of such sources as the statute; s 
legislative history, purpose, and structure. 17 The Supreme 
Court itself has not been especially consistent in its 
approach.ls This inconsistency buttresses the point that 
statutory construction is a judicial art, and courts may find 
it useful to vary their approaches according to the individual 
circumstances. An adherence to a one-sided approach, 
therefore, is an uncritical, if not a myopic, exercise. 
This Article rejects as incomplete an exercise in 
construction that relies unwisely on a statute's text. As 
illustrated with hypothetical Joe above, and also developed 
below, this author disagrees with the view that textual 
plainness is the only barometer for measuring textual 
ambiguity. To be unambiguous, a statute must be capable 
of a judicious, intelligible, and not an absurd application. 
This Article, however, also rejects, as an unnecessary 
16 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter, Scalia, Rules]; Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) 
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Domains]. 
17 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS & 
REFORMS 286 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
321 (1990). 
18 See, e.g., Estate of Covert v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 
(1992) (relying on the text of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, 33 U.s.C. § 933(g), to hold that the injured 
employee of an oil company forfeited his rights to benefits under 
that section when he failed to obtain the written approval of his 
employer and the employer's insurer before settling his action 
against a third-party tortfeasor); Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (relying on the structure 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655, to 
hold that the Act preempted a similar Illinois Act, noting, at 99, 
that "[t]he design of the statute persuades us that Congress 
intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of 
regulations .... "); Wisconsin Public Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 
U.S. 597 (1991) (examining the legislative history of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U .S.C. § 136 et 
seq., in ruling that the Act did not preempt the local government's 
regulation of pesticide use). 
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usurpation oflegislative authority, the unbounded resort 
to legislative history, especially where a statute's meaning 
is starkly apparent from the text. 
The author views statutory construction as a 
comprehensive act, which requires courts. and legal 
practitioners to employ a combination of those 
interpretative tools that can render a statute judiciously 
intelligible. Part II of this article provides necessary 
background materials with which to understand this 
argument. Part III examines the common approaches to 
statutory construction. Part IV presents a case-note 
example of the Supreme Court's "passive" approach to 
construction, with a specific critique of Justice Scalia's 
textualism. Part V discusses a better approach to 
interpretation, using the Court of Appeals of Maryland as 
an example. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Case-Law Syndrome 
With the dominance of the case-law method in law-
school instruction,19 it is easy for law graduates to 
underestimate the ubiquity of statutory analysis in legal 
practice. The case-law method, which is epitomized by 
the Socratic method, thrives on the premise that students 
are better taught to think like lawyers by learning how 
older lawyers and judges have thought before them.20 This 
Socratic journey begins usually in the first week oflaw 
school, when students are taught the valuable lesson of 
case-briefing. To succeed in this endeavor, the student 
must learn to dissect a judicial opinion - to understand 
who sued whom, who did what to whom, who has what 
19 See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case 
Method: A Marvelous Adventure In Which Winnie-The -Pooh 
Meets Mrs. PalsgraJ, 34 CAL. W.L. REV. 351 (1998); see also W. 
Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. I (I 997). 
20 See Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching 
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1,20 
(1996). In a survey by Professor Friedland, 46% of sampled law 
professors said their aim in teaching first-year students was for 
the students to improve their thinking ability, compared to 15% 
who said they wanted the students to learn substantive legal 
doctrine, and 31 % who aimed at both objectives. See id. 
30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 7 
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rights, and, most important, what the court said about the 
whole situation. The idea, as engineered by Professor 
Langdell at Harvard in the 1870s, is that by perusing 
appellate opinions the student would develop a critical flair 
for analyzing subsequent legal problems.21 At the University 
of Baltimore, for instance, this lesson begins in orientation 
week with the famous Thomas v. Winchester. 22 
F or those who briefed Thomas as a first law-school 
exercise, little doubt exists that such was a mind-boggling 
experience. Most laborious was the attempt to demystifY 
the court's unorganized use of nineteenth-century legalese. 
Because the opinion is so poorly written, however, it makes 
an excellent apparatus for introducing new students to the 
case-law method of instruction. The students are expected 
not only to disentangle the factual intricacies of the case, 
but also to follow the court's muddy analysis. Attheweek's 
end, the amiable Professor Easton hopes to have oriented 
the students enough for what would permeate their first-
year substantive courses - case analysis. As to those 
students who came to law school to leam "the law," they 
must develop a new respect for judicial opinions, and 
overwrite the impression that law is couched in black and 
white. They must learn, instead, to use the judge's 
oftentimes-flowelY language as a blueprint for what may 
seem like a legal chess game. In Torts, for example, the 
students must be able to discern the assumption-of-risk 
21 See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living With The 
Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REv. 517, 549-52 (1991). 
226 N.Y. 397(1852): Mr. Thomas, the husband of an ill wom'!n 
purchased a medicinal extract, believing it to be what the label 
portrayed. But the manufacturer's employee mislabeled the bottle; 
the bottle actually contained a poisonous liquid. Mrs. Thomas 
drank the liquid and suffered physiological and psychological 
injuries. Unfortunately for the Thomases, Mr. Thomas did not 
buy the drug directly ITom the manufacturer, and New York law at 
the time required privity of contract for a suit to succeed against 
a manufacturer. With the case, however, the court changed the 
law. Winchester had to compensate Mrs. Thomas because the 
item sold was of a dangerous nature, and posed an imminent 
danger to unsuspecting customers, who also were more likely to 
consume the item than was the vendor who bought directly ITom 
Winchester. Thus, the genesis of New York's product liability 
law ignited. 
30.2 U. BaIt L.F. 8 
theory from Judge Cardozo's colorful articulation in 
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement CO.23 
From the language in Murphy, the Torts student must 
be able to argue, for instance, that the weak-at-heart who 
seeks amusement in a House o/Horror assumes the risk 
of a heart attack. Or that one who goes on a bumper ride 
may not later claim damages for injuries from another 
participant's bmnp. With a little creativity, and a proficiency 
in case-synthesis, the first-year law student becomes a 
learned analogist. This is the case-law method, whether 
standing alone or supplemented by the problem-method;24 
law students are taught through casebooks. Withjudicial 
opinions like Judge Cardozo's, Judge Hand's, or Judge 
Friendly's, such an education is intriguing, even though 
challenging. There are two main drawbacks, however. 
First, because the case-law method depends on appellate 
opinions, which present cases already developed and 
refined by lawyers and judges, it limits the extent to which 
students develop their originality. 25 Second, and more 
23 250 NY. 479 {I 929): 
Valenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a 
sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they 
are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the 
risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at the 
ball game the chance of contact with the ball. . .. The 
antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered 
cleric. The rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of 
the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are not the 
pleasures of tranquillity. The plaintiff was not seeking a 
retreat for meditation. Visitors were tumbling about the 
belt to the merriment of onlookers when he made his 
choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, 
with whatever damage to his body might ensue from 
such afall. The timorous may stay at home. 
Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiffin 
Murphy fractured his kneecap when he was thrown backward by 
"the Flopper," a ride offered by the defendant to the public in its 
amusement park. The fun in riding "the Flopper" came from its 
jerky movement, the riders falling on one another, the screams 
and laughter. The plaintiff knew that he could fall, yet he got on 
the ride. See id. at 480-81. 
24 See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem 
Method Dichotomy: The Debate Over Teaching Methods 
Continues, 1998 B.v.u. Eouc. & L.J. 1 (1998). 
25 See Weaver, supra note 21, at 591. 
relevant to the discussion here, the case-law method 
relegates statutory law to the background, and distorts 
students' ideas about actual legal practice. Because 
students become comfortable with approaching legal 
problems in a casebook fashion, they find it increasingly 
hard to develop an appreciation for statutory law.26 
This mediocre attitude towards statutory law is more 
so fortified by the absence of courses in statutory 
construction from law school curriculumY Because law 
schools generally have not stressed the primacy of statutes 
in their curricula, emphasizing instead the ratio decedendi 
of judicial opinions,28 few students ever get to know or 
master statutory construction in their law school careers.29 
Even where, as might be the case today, many law schools 
offer courses on legislation,30 these courses are not included 
in the required curricula.31 Some schools treat statutory 
construction only in the context of those substantive 
courses that derive primarily from codified law (tax 
courses, for example), noping that interpretative skills 
would "rob off' on students. 32 This approach - called 
26 See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis: " A 
Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 438 (1986). 
27 See HOWARD ABADINSKY, LAW AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE AMERlACN LEGAL SYSTEM 89-112 (3d. 1995). 
28 See id. 
29 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); 
see also Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills 
in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 663 (1987) 
(arguing that "[r]everence for tradition in law and for our common 
law roots seems to have exercised a deadhand control in this 
area, restraining any increase in emphasis in legal education on 
the study of legislation and its interpretation"). 
30 See Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canon and 
Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 
62 OEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,5 (1993). 
31 See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664. The University of Baltimore, 
for example, offers the course Legislation as an upper-level 
elective course, not as part of its intense and well-respected legal 
skills program. 
32 See id. 
Articles 
"the pervasive method"33 - is, however, faulty because it 
attends primarily to substantive issues, not to the legislative 
process or interpretative principles.34 As Judge Posner 
noted, a law pro fessor' s expertise in a particular statute is 
not a substitute for the systematic knowledge required for 
teaching legislation.35 What is ironic about this gap in law 
school instruction is that most legal disputes today are likely 
to concern legislative enactment - statutes, regulations, or 
ordinances.36 In fact, it would not be farfetched to say 
that more than fifty percent of cases decided annually by 
the United States Supreme Court involve statutory 
interpretation.37 The story is not too different in state 
courts. For instance, about half of the eighty cases decided 
between September 15, 1995 and May 17,'1996 by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland required the court to 
interpret a constitutional or statutory provision.38 Yet most 
lawyers, and even trial judges, are not properly attentive 
to interpretation issues.39 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Posner, supra note 29, at 80 I; see also William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship amd Pedagogy 
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 691-92 
(1'987) (noting that, although substantive courses "can teach 
students a great deal about working with statutes, ... they do not 
approach statutes as a systematic topic of inquiry and do not 
teach general skills of dealing with legislatures and their statutory 
products"). 
36 See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664. 
37 Ofthe 99 Supreme Court cases sampled by this author from the 
period between April, 1999 and April, 2000, 51 addressed some 
form of statutory construction issue. 
38 See Annual Review of Maryland Law: Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, 1995-96 Opinions, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1996). 
39 See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664. 
30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 9 
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B. What is Statutory Construction? 
Statutory construction, according to Professor 
Eskridge, is "the Cinderella oflegal scholarship."40 For 
years, it received little, if any, academic attention, despite 
its first significant root in Aristotlean writings.41 But, 
because civil obligations have derived much from the 
existence of codified provisions, statutory construction is 
at least as old as the quest to understand such obligations.42 
As Professor Eskridge further observed, the general 
applicability of statutory directives has historically 
depended on how practical such directives are to 
individuals.43 Even as far back as the Code ofHummurabi 
in ancient Babylonia, and the Justinian Code oflater Roman 
Empire, law's legitimacy flowed from how amenable its 
contents were to interpretation.44 The interpreter's job, 
far from being passive and abstract, was an involved and 
a contextual endeavor, which gave an interpreter the 
incidental power to dictate the direction of a statutory 
command. 
In today's society, the judge is that celebrated 
interpreter, mainly by virtue of a constitutional duty. 
Statutory construction, therefore, is the judicial attempt to 
give meaning to a statute, so as to decide whether and 
how the statute applies to a particular action. This quest 
for meaning is usually an artistic function,45 whose 
complexity depends on how ambiguous the statutory 
language is, and on the angle from which the judge tackles 
such ambiguity. Even with its various approaches, however, 
modem statutory interpretation developed from ancient 
legal hermeneutics, which emphasized a dynamic 
40 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 1 
(1994). 
41 See id. at 1-3. 
42 See id. at I. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 2. 
45 See generally Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading 
relationship between the interpreter and the author.46 
Therefore, the judge's approach to statutory construction 
must express a judicious connection between a statute's 
enactment and its application and effects - it must be the 
judicial placenta between the legislative conception and 
the constitutional life of a statute. 
Although legislative pronouncements have increased 
in modem times, and despite the distinguished intellectual 
history of statutory interpretation, American scholars did 
not become terribly attentive to this area of legal 
development until the early 1980s.47 Even then, there was 
no attempt to formulate a coherent system of interpretation 
that translated into a unique legal discipline.48 Statutory 
construction, unsettled and unbranded, has been a judicial 
"Hail-Mary," with a case-by-case hope that a particular 
judge would be blessed with the wisdom of biblical 
46 See Eskridge, supra note 40, at 4: Long before legal 
hermeneutics, however, Aristotle had, in his Rhetoric and 
Nicomachean Ethics, formulated his principles of statutory 
interpretation based on the concept of practical wisdom. In his 
view, statutory texts were not cast in stones, but were to be 
interpreted according to individual circumstances. This 
Chameleonic approach was to be followed later by the writers of 
the accompanying Digest to the Roman Justinian Code, who, 
although advocated a more directed approach, saw statutory 
interpretation also as a flexible endeavor. Building on Aristotle's 
Rhetoric and the Justinian Digest, the legal hermeneuticists of 
the Enlightement age, from whom modem theories developed, 
offered an approach that objectified the intent of the statutory 
author. To this end, one interpreting a statutory language was to 
assume the author's position, imaginatively reconstructing the 
circumstances surrounding the statute's creation, and interpreting 
the statute according to how those circumstances were 
understood. Modem hermeneuticists, such as legal process 
theorists, recognize, however, the problem with imaginative 
construction. As such, they offer statutory interpretation as a 
system under which the judge must give a statute such reading 
as is in line with the statute's purpose, paying particular attention 
to how the present situation has changed from one existing when 
the statute was written. As developed more in Part III of this 
article, many theories have resulted since then. See id. at 2-5. 
47 See id. at 1-2. 
a/Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 527 (1947). 48 See id. 
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Solomon.49 Even with the presently heightened interest 
by scholars, and the resultant enrichment of the judge's 
toolbox, current efforts have not necessarily amounted to 
a settled legal discipline. 50 To understand this intellectual 
lag, and thereby control the case-law syndrome, one must 
first understand the nature of codified law, especially with 
regards to the development of the American legal system. 
C. The American Codes of Statutes 
In simplistic terms, a statute can be defined as "a 
command of a particular legislature (federal, state, 
municipal) that must be obeyed, under threat of 
governmental sanction, by those whose behavior it 
regulates. "5 I In more descriptive terms: 
[O]n their face, statutes appear abstract. They 
reveal no story, no characters, no drama -
usually just a dry recitation of rights and 
obligations. Sometimes their provisions conflict 
or are unclear or vague. But ... statutes never 
represent the abstract exercise of power. 
They are always the legislative response to 
problems identified by legislative bodies as 
needing resolution in a particular fashion. Every 
statute has a story behind it, although (unlike a 
judicial decision) its story is usually untold in 
the statutory language. Often the story is quite 
dramatic. Second, statutes are almost always 
the products of compromise. 52 
49 The approach employed is akin to the last-minute attempt by a 
losing quarterback in a football game to salvage the game by 
throwing the ball to the end-zone, without regards to the relative 
positions ofthe players, hoping that one of his teammates would 
catch the ball and score a touchdown - what is commonly referred 
to as a "Hail-Mary" pass. 
50 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
51 ABNER 1. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2 ( 1997) . 
52Id at I (emphasis added). 
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To the extent that statutes direct more than they 
describe, they are skeletal in nature. Even though they 
could not exist without the "why" of the story they present, 
they recite only the "who," "what," and sometimes the 
"how," but seldom express the "why." They are the 
legislative expression of present public policy, which may 
not exist long enough to govern future conducts. 53 Because 
statutes are the problem-responding announcements of 
individual policy goals, they differ from case law in the 
latter's foundation on a fact-specific, two-party dispute. 
Statutes have been a part of the American legal and political 
system for ages. What is relatively foreign to the American 
polity, however, is the concept of codified law. American 
law, like its English antecedent, was not cast in a mosaic 
stone, but was a philosophical product of tentative 
legislation and judicial experimentation. As it epitomized 
the Crown's legitimacy, and also represented an 
ecclesiastical attempt at equity, the English common law 
had to be fact-restrained. 54 The law was "commonly" 
formulated by judges, who ironically were not "common 
men," but mainly royal intelligentsia with lukewarm 
attitudes toward codes. 55 The American law followed 
this disposition. 
Codes, during the formative years of the United 
States, were unique to civil law regimes, such as the French 
and German systems.56 While the French and German 
political environments were ripe for codified law, the 
American experience counseled a reliance on the English 
common-law system. The French Code Napoleon, for 
example, resulted from the French revolution against the 
I 'ancien regime. 57 Moreover, pre-revolution French law 
53 See Randall B. Ripley, Stages o/the Policy Process, in PUBLIC 
POLICY THEORIES, MODELS, AND CONCEPTS: AN ANTHOLOGY 157, 158-
161 (Daniel C. McCool ed., 1995). 
54 See generally LEWIS MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 338-
366 (rev. ed. 1964). 
55 See id. 
56 See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: 
A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 71 (1981). 
57 See id. at 3. 
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actually drew from various Roman codes. 58 The American 
legal revolution, in contrast, did not disband the common-
law system. 59 American patriots, unlike the French, were 
not dissatisfied with the law as it existed in colonial times.60 
They were aggrieved, instead, by the Crown's obstruction 
of justice as in the subj ugation of the judge's 
independence.61 They sought, therefore, to discontinue 
the whimsical application of the existing law, not to replace 
the law with civil codes.62 
The American codification movement, as a result, 
was not ignited until the nineteenth century when Jeremy 
Bentham passionately advocated for importing the 
European civil codes.63 This movement derived essentially 
from the democratic exigency in making the law more 
accessible to those it sought to control. 64 Before then, the 
country had consistently rebuffed various calls to enshrine 
a code system.65 Even Bentham's two letters to President 
Madison in 1811 did not persuade the President to 
commission a federal codification taskforce.66 But, as it 
58 See id. at 71. 
59 See id. at 3. 
60 See id. at 4. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 69-92. The greater part ofthe problem comes from the 
law being scattered in various locations. There was, of course, 
no organized system of legal publication, as in today's official 
and national reporter systems. Even congressional acts were 
mostly in leaflets, and it was a cherished privilege to own copies. 
See generally id. 
65 See id. 
66 See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: 
Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COL. L. REV. 1098, 1099 (1978). 
Bentham's argument fared better with such states as Louisiana, 
the Dakota territory, California, Georgia, New York, Montana and 
Alabama, although not equally. See id.; see also Andrew P. 
Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws" - Lessons 
From One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. 
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became increasingly difficult for the average citizen to know 
what the legal obligations were, attitudes towards 
codification began to change.67 The potential for political 
instability corning from the lawlessness that could result 
from the inaccessibility and uncertainty of the law prompted 
the nineteenth-century surge to codify the law.68 
The above is important in discussing how the u.s. 
law, even in today's codified fomlat, differs fundamentally 
from European codes. Any viable system of statutory 
construction must be informed by these historical 
differences. To appreciate also why American codes 
require a different interpretative approach from European 
codes, it is paramount to acquaint oneself with the 
fundamental distinction between codes and statutes, and 
with how one code system differs from another. The 
common-law lawyer may find it hard to grasp this 
distinction, especially as codes and statutes are used 
interchangeably. But, while a statute is the actual law, a 
code is the form in which the law exists. A code is the 
systemic communication of the law - the evidence ofthe 
law. It is different from statutes in that statutes are mere 
legislative proclamations by the legislature. In the case of 
the U.S. federal statute, for example, they are usually the 
acts of Congress signed by the President. Because 
American codes began as a way of putting the average 
citizen on notice,69 they are not codes in the actual 
philosophical sense. They are codes of publication 
convenience - they are not "substantive," but "formal," 
codes.70 
A fonnal code does not begin with the original attempt 
at philosophically formulating a coherent body oflaw.71 
L. REV. 359 (1995); Lewis Grossman, Codification and the 
California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1994). 
67 See Cook, supra note 56, at 12-18. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See generally Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and 
Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073 (1988). 
71 See id. at 1088. 
It does not involve any creative social engineering that is 
geared towards the normative comprehension of an ideal 
social order. It is, instead: 
[A]n administrative undertaking aimed only at 
grouping together preexisting and scattered rules 
without modifying their content. It is nothing 
but a compilation for the purpose of facilitating, 
through their gathering, the knowledge of 
numerous rules, from varied and scattered 
sources. In other words, it is a purely formal 
gathering and unification of texts. 72 
The important point here is that U.S. codes, as 
products of formal codification, do not present a syllogistic 
framework for future development. 73 As "statute codes,"74 
they lack rules ofinterpretation.75 They are after-the-fact 
compilations of mere statutory recitations,76 and do not 
comprehend those general principles that allow for a 
deductive application, as is the case with civil codes. 77 
Because they contain problem-responding enactment, 
formal codes rank experience over doctrinal logic. 78 This 
is in line with the common law's traditional caution against 
"freezing" the law in ancient philosophy. 79 As a result, 
721d. at lO89 (citations omitted). 
73 See id. at 1092. 
74 See Bruce Donald, Codifications in Common Law Systems, 47 
AusT. L. REV. 160,171 (1973). 
75 See Bergel, supra note 70, at 1092. 
76 As Bergel notes, see id., this is done usually by grouping the 
law in an alphabetical order according to the subject-matters. 
See, for example, the Maryland Code, beginning with the 
Agriculture Article, and ending with the Transportation Article. 
77 See Bergel, supra note 70, at 1090. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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although common law codes are easy to update, they 
present a special problem for the interpreter because they 
are easily outdated by social change.80 
In contrast to common-law formal codification, 
substantive codification, as in civil codes, "consists of 
devising and shaping a coherent body of new or renovated 
rules within a whole aimed at instituting or reviewing a 
legal order," and "presupposes a rather elaborate clear, 
precise and definite written law .... "81 Consider the 
following elaboration: 
A [substantive] code stems from the will of its 
authors to consecrate a doctrine and to translate 
a specific inspiration into positive law. Even 
though the innovative forces vary according to 
the circumstances, a true codification aims at 
instituting a coherent body of new or renewed 
legal rules destined to either establish a new 
order or to restore the preexisting order. It 
occurs only after a thorough research, a general 
reflection, and a creative effort through which 
choices have been made, guidelines laid down 
and, lastly, decisions taken. Thus, in France, 
the 1804 Civil Code was based on fundamental 
ideas which were quite new at the time: the 
uniformity of the law throughout the whole 
territory; the acknowledgement oflegislation as 
the only real source of law; the 
comprehensiveness of the law regulating all 
social relations; the separation of law from 
morals, religion, and politics. 82 
Ideally, the drafting of substantive codes begins with 
the philosophical writings of a celebrated jurist or a group 
80 See id. at 1092. Because "statute codes" are easy to update 
does not mean that they routinely have been updated. Legislative 
politics may present a greater obstacle to a statute's revision 
than its original enactment, especially given congressional 
schedules. 
81 [d. at 1077-78. 
82 [d. at 1078. 
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of eminent jurists, who the legislature may entrust to 
transform those writings into codes, or whose writings may 
begin as a specific commission by the legislature to draft 
the codes.83 As described in the quoted passage above, 
substantive codification strives to create a long-lasting 
framework and direction of the law.84 The focus usually 
is on uniformity and stability, as the codes are written with 
such a prospective vigor as to go beyond a simple, cyclical 
legislation.85 Regardless of what they are called -
"complete comprehensive,"86 "institutional 
comprehensive,"87 "fully comprehensive,"88 or "field 
comprehensive"89 - substantive codes are not mere 
compilations of individual statutes, but legislatively adopted 
statements of durable legal doctrines. They present 
"organized system [ s J of general rules which will be easy 
to discover so that from these rules, through an easy 
process,judges and citizens may deduce the manner in 
which this or that practical difficulty must be solved."90 
Unlike American "statute codes," they are not the 
spontaneous results oflegislative politics, but, instead, 
embody a systematic conception of a coherent judicial 
philosophy. Thus, from a stated general principle, the 
interpreter of such a code can, through logical reasoning, 
deduce the solution to any given problem; there really is 
83 See id. Professor Bergel gives the following examples: 
Switzerland's civil code that was drafted by E. Huber; France's 
new family law coming from Dean 1. Carbonnier's writing; and the 
Napoleonic Code drafted by a commission of jurists. See id. 
84 See id. 
8S See id. at 1079. 
86 See Donald, supra note 74, at 164-65. 
87 See id. at 165-68. 
88 See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law? 
- Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial 
Practice and the Law's Substantive Development, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 1119, 1127-29(1994). 
89 See id. at 1129-31. 
90 See T. Huc, Commentaire et pratique du code civil 37 (1892), 
quoted in Bergel, supra note 70, at 1080. 
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little need to consult the legislature for answers to 
interpretation questions. This is because the code should 
be "broad enough to be able to regulate various real 
situations."91 While the advantages of this system are 
numerous, it may be criticized as retarding law's evolution 
and progress,n especially in a system where the judge 
must contribute actively to law's development. Hence, they 
should not be subjected to the same rules of interpretation 
that govern common-law statutes-codes. 
III. NOTABLE APPROACHES TO STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 
Whatever differences exist among modem theories 
of statutory construction may relate especially to 
disagreements about (1) the judge's function in American 
constitutional democracy, and (2) how the judge can 
perform that function without trampling the separation-of-
powers doctrine. These disagreements, however, are 
overexagerated, and may tum out to be merely a subtle 
projection of individual ideological bearings, which does 
not really translate into a patent homage to the Constitution. 
Although these approaches have certain similarities in their 
premises, and may even share a blurry aspiration to an 
otherwise unitary goal, three main theoretical camps can 
be distinguished: purposivism, intentionalism, and 
textualism. 
A. Purposivism 
Commonly associated with Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks, this theoretical approach is premised on the idea 
that a statute's proper interpretation cannot emerge without 
91 See id. at 1083. 
92 See id. at 1079. 
a close attention to the statute's purpose.93 Because, in 
the legal-process tradition of Hart and Sacks, a statute 
culminates from the legislative purpose of addressing a 
particular problem, any reasonable attempt at discerning 
the statute's meaning must include an understanding of that 
purpose.94 Where the statute's literal interpretation would 
lead to absurd results, therefore, the statute must be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the particular 
purpose.95 Consider the following example. 
A statutory provision commands that "[ c ]orporations 
... organized and operated for religious, charitable ... or 
educational purposes" may not be required to pay taxes.96 
A certain University, which obviously is organized and 
operated for "educational purposes," but does not consider 
African-American applicants for admission into its 
program, applies to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
93 Professors Hart and Sacks, relying on Max Radin's legal realism, 
had fonnulated two principal assumptions about legislation. They 
argued, first, that every statute has some form of purpose or 
objective and, second, that legislation involved an informed, 
deliberative and efficient process which governs the legislative 
quest for the particular purposive law. See generally HENRY HART 
& ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW (1958); see also ALEXANDER 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 62 (1962) (discussing the importance of 
purpose in statutory construction); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN 
QUEST OF ITSELF (1940) (fonnulating the theory that law is a function 
of societal purpose); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667 (1958) (arguing that statutory 
interpretation- should be focused on a statute's purpose and 
structure, not its words); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 
43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930) (denouncing legislative intent in favor 
of a legislative purpose as a tool of statutory interpretation). Cf 
Frankfurter, supra note 45, at 528 (observing that statutes are the 
practical media of communicating governmental purposes). 
94 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. This point is properly 
captured by the Court's language in Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892)( emphasis added): "It is a familiar 
rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not 
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the 
intention of its makers." 
96 See 26 U.S.C. § 50 1 (c)(3)(1 954). 
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for a tax-exempt status based on the provision above. 
The IRS denies the request, citing the University's 
discriminatory policy. The University appeals this 
determination to the federal court, relying on the statutory 
text. It argues that a literal interpretation of the text warrants 
it a tax-exempt status. This argument is forceful. There is 
nothing in the text that requires that, to deserve a tax-
exempt status, the University must be nondiscriminatory 
in its organization and operation. To follow the statute's 
text sheepishly, however, would mean agovemmental 
support of discrimination - an absurd, .if not an 
unconstitutional, result. Hence, to the purposivists, the 
court must avoid such absurdity, and must, therefore, 
consult the purpose and policy behind the statutory section. 
This was precisely what the Supreme Court did in Bob 
Jones University v. United States. 97 
In that case, the Court disregarded the literal language 
of § 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code for the 
purposivist view that "underlying all relevant parts of the 
Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends 
on meeting certain common law standards of charity -
namely, that an institution seeking tax -exempt status must 
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established 
public policy [against discrimination ].''98 The Court found 
that the legislative purpose of § 501 (c )(3) was "to provide 
tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the 
development of private institutions that serve a useful public 
purpose .... "99 It noted that "[t]ax exemptions for certain 
institutions thought beneficial to the social order of the 
country as a whole . .. are deeply rooted in our history . 
..• "100 A discriminatory organization, it follows, goes 
against such purpose. 
The purposivist approach is based, of course, on 
the necessary assumption that the statutory interpreter can 
97 461 u.S. 574 (1983). The factual narration in the text is a simplified 
version of the facts in Bob Jones. See id. at 577-83. 
981d. at586. 
991d. at 588. 
1001d. (emphasis added). 
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readily discern the purpose of every statute. IOI This 
assumption is indeed correct to some extent. Some statutes 
may actually contain purpose-sections - sections 
announcing the purposes of the statutes. 102 In those 
circumstances, the judge's job becomes a bit less 
complicated. But the job is not altogether easy, because a 
statute may contain more than one purpose in its text. 103 
101 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 93, at 1156; see also Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be construed, 3 V AND. 
L. REv. 395, 400-402 (1950). 
102 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1999)(declaring the purpose ofthe 
Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA»: 
Congressional statement of findings and declaration of 
purpose and policy 
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and 
illnesses arising out of work situations impose a 
substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, 
interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage 
loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation 
payments. 
(b) The Congress declares itto be its purpose and policy, 
through the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce 
among the several States and with foreign nations and 
to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the Nation 
safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve 
our human resources-
15 U.S.c. § 264I(b) (1997) (stating the purpose of the Asbestos 
Hazard Emergency Response Act): 
(b) Purpose 
The purpose of this subchapter is-
(I) to provide for the establishment of Federal 
regulations which require inspection for asbestos-
containing material and implementation of appropriate 
response actions with respect to asbestos-containing 
material in the Nation's schools in a safe and complete 
manner; 
(2) to mandate safe and complete periodic 
reinspection of school buildings following response 
actions, where appropriate; and 
(3) to require the Administrator to conduct a study 
to find out the extent of the danger to human health 
posed by asbestos in public and commercial buildings 
and the means to respond to any such danger. 
10] See 15 U .S.c. § 2641, supra note 102. 
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The difficult aspect is deciding which purpose applies to 
the presenting situation. In that case, the purposivist 
approach is a much more complicated endeavor, as the 
search for the particular statute's purpose may even be 
more confusing than the ambiguous text. For, where the 
statute's purpose is not codified, the judge must sift 
legislative records to decide on a purpose - a job that 
may be akin to chasing a moving target. It is mainly for 
this reason - the use oflegislative history - that opponents 
of purposivism criticize the method. 104 But, although such 
criticisms continue to intensify, purposivism remains a 
common approach to statutory construction. 105 
B. Intentionalism 
Like the purposivist approach, intentionalism thrives 
on the use oflegislative history, and also seeks to readily 
go beyond a literal interpretation of statutory text to answer 
the absurdity question. The basic notion of intentionalism 
is that an exercise in statutory construction must revolve 
around the legislative intent of a statute.106 The interpreter 
asks: what was the intent of the legislator in drafting the 
particular statutory provision - "what were the drafters 
thinking and why were they thinking this rather than 
something else when they wrote the text?" 107 
104 See infra Part III (D). 
105 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court. Statutory 
Interpretation, Internal Burdens, and a Misleading Version of 
Democracy,22 U. ToL. L. REv. 583, 594-95 (\991). 
106 See generally James Landis, A Note on "Statutory 
Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1930). 
107 See Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical 
Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 
MISS. L.J. 225 (1998). 
Legislative intent should not be confused with 
legislative purpose, even though attempts to differentiate 
the two concepts may indeed be laborious. IDS One can 
distinguish the concepts by looking closely at the questions 
implicated. While "purpose" asks the "why" question, 
"intent" goes more to the "how" and "what." As to purpose, 
the interpreter asks why the legislators enacted a particular 
statute - the general goal of the statute. For intent, the 
issue is how the legislators intended to use a particular 
provision to achieve the statutory goal (or purpose). One 
asks: How did the legislators mean to apply the provision? 
What did they intend to communicate or achieve when 
they used such and such words? Did they intend the 
particular result to which the court's interpretation leads? 
"Intent," thus, reveals inore of the text's intended meaning, 
and "purpose" is simply the broad goal of the statute. 
As Professors Eskridge and Frickey noted, there are 
at least three variants of intentionalism - three kinds of 
intent that the statutory interpreter may seek: actual intent; 
conventional intent; and imaginatively reconstructed 
intent. I 09 As to actual intent, the statutory interpreter seeks 
to understand what all of the enacting legislators actually 
intended by the provision. I 10 This is not an easy task, 
especially bearing in mind the number oflegislators involved 
108 In fact, courts have variously employed the words in a 
confusing manner, sometimes, using them interchangeably. See, 
e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,972 (1997) (emphasis 
added) ("But even assuming the correctness of the Court of 
Appeals' implicit premise-that a legislative purpose to interfere 
with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the 
effect of interfering with that right ... could render the Montana 
law invalid-there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative 
purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative 
intent even when statutes produce harmful results .... "); Leavitt 
v. Jane, 518 U.S. 137, 143 (1996) (emphasis added) ("Every 
legislature that adopts, in a single enactment, provision A plus 
provision B intends (A+B); and that enactment, which reads 
(A+B), is invariably a 'unified expression of that intent,' so that 
taking away A from (A+B), leaving only B, will invariably' clearly 
undermine the legislative purpose' to enact (A+B). But the fallacy 
in applying this reasoning to the severability question is that it is 
not the severing that will take away A from (A+B) and thus foil 
the legislature's intent."). 
109 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 325-32. 
110 See id. at 326. 
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in the formulation of such intent. III Thus, the interpreter 
may rely on conventional intent. Conventional intent can 
be gleaned from the statements of those who worked 
closely with the statute throughout its enactment - the 
legislation's sponsors and floor managers, for instance. 112 
This may be done through such legislative records as 
committee reports and records of floor debates. 113 This 
is a "de facto representative intent" in the sense that the 
intent of few legislators is imputed to the whole legislature. 
The third variant of intentional ism - Judge Posner's 
imaginative reconstruction - presents a two-part analysis. I 14 
First, the interpreting judge tries to "put himselfin the shoes 
of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would 
have wanted the statute applied to the case before him."IIS 
If this inquiry is fruitless, "the judge must [then] decide 
what attribution of meaning to the statute will yield the 
most reasonable result ... ," bearing in mind "it is [the 
legislators '] conception of reasonableness, to the extent 
known, rather than the judge's, that should guide the 
decision. "116 Notwithstanding the variant of intentionalism 
employed, the idea is thatthe judge must act "as the enacting 
legislature's faithful servant, discovering and applying the 
legislature's original intent." II 7 This indeed is the most 
commonly employed of the approaches to interpretation. I IS 
III See Radin, supra note 93, at 869-70 (observing that legislative 
intent could not be the intent of all the legislators voting for the 
statute). 
112 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 327. 
113 See Landis, supra note 106, at 888-89 (discussing the values of 
legislative records in discerning legislative intent). . 
114 See Posner, supra note 17, at 286-93 [hereinafter, Federal 
Courts]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A 
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 4-14 (1988) [hereinafter, Posner, Law 
& Literature]. 
115 Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 17, at 286-87. 
1161d. at 287. This approach can be summarized thus: the first 
issue relates to what the legislators would have wanted, and the 
second is what they would have found reasonable or acceptable. 
Notice that these questions are related on a continuum. 
117 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 325. 
118 See id. 
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c. Textualism 
Unlike both pmposivism and intentionalism, textualism 
denOlU1ces the use oflegislative history. To the textualistS, 
statutory interpretation must not involve the quest for 
legislative purpose and intent through legislative records. 
Instead, the proper aim is to understand "the intent that a 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, 
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris. "119 
Intent and purpose, according to textuaiists, are objectified 
by statutory text, not discoverable from legislative 
history.12o Even where the text leads to absurd results, 
and the judge must search for understanding outside the 
particular provision, the judge should look only to the 
structure of the statute, interpretations of similar provisions, 
and canons of statutory construction. The judge should 
also use these aids if the desire is merely to confirm the 
literal interpretation of a text. 121 
The textualist approach derives indeed from those 
scholars who, influenced by public-choice theory (and law 
and economics jurisprudence), strongly reject the 
purposivist and intentionalist reliance on legislative 
history.122 There are two main versions oftextualism. 123 
119 Antonin Scalia, Common-law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 16-17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter, 
Scalia, Common-law Courts]. 
120 See id. 
121 See William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 
621 , 624 (1990). 
122 The public-choice theory rejects Hart and Sacks's view that 
legislators are rational people striving to enact purposive laws 
for public benefit. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the 
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 
MINN. L. REv. 241,250 (1992). Relying on public-choice postulates, 
law and economics scholars argue that statutes represent broad 
interest-group purposes in the form of legislative compromises. 
See id. Thus, statutory construction must be restrained to the 
codified evidence of these legislative compromises - the statutory 
text; any attempt to look for a broader purpose outside the text 
would lead to a deviation from what actually made it through the 
legislative process. See id. 
123 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 340. 
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There is the stricter version, which depends solely on the 
text as the supreme source of meaning. 124 Relying on this 
version, " '[ w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; 
we ask only what the statute mean.' "125 This method 
begins and ends with the literal interpretation of the text, 
paying no attention to legislative intent. 126 Thus, if a statute 
states that "no one shall drive less than fifty miles per hour 
on Interstate 95, between Richmond, Virginia and 
Baltimore, Maryland," the strict textualist would not care 
if Senior Citizen Smith drives thirty-five miles per hour 
because of bad eyesight or inclement weather. She would 
neither inquire whether the legislature intended the law to 
apply with the same vigor at all times, nor consider the 
fact that the legislature's purpose in enacting the law was 
to curb ')oy-riding" on the freeway. The second variant 
oftextuaiism is, however, "less ambitious."127 It relies on 
a statute's text not as a replacement but as evidence of the 
statute's legislative intent or purpose. 128 Following this 
scheme, " '[ t ] here is ... no more persuasive evidence of 
the purpose of a statute than the words by which the 
legislature undertook to give expression of its wishes.' "129 
124 See id. 
125 Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv.417, 419 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920)). 
126 See id. 
1271d. 
128 See id. at 341. 
1291d. (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 
U.S. 534,543 (1940)). 
The basic textualist arguments above are the basis 
oftoday's prominent and highly reinvigorated textualism-
what Professor Eskridge calls The New Textualism. 130 
In the new textualists' view, the judge's interpretative 
scheme must be confmed to the four comers of a statute, 
because "[i]fthe question of a statute's domain may not 
often be resolved by reference to actual design, it may 
never properly be resolved by reference to imputed 
design." 13 I Statutory provisions, hence, must be interpreted 
on the basis of ordinary (as opposed to legislative) context 
and word-usage, and consitent with the whole body of 
law within which the provision fits. 132 The notoriety of this 
textualist brand followed Justice Scalia's ascension to, first, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and, 
second, the United States Supreme Court. 133 His vigor in 
projecting a textualist approach to interpretation is 
premised on his dissatisfaction with both the purposivist 
and intentionalist methods. 134 
130 See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 623. Professor Eskridge uses 
the word New Textualism to describe the new and modified wave 
ofthe old plain-meaning method. See id. at 623. Contrasted with 
the new textual ism, the old plain-meaning rule requires the 
interpreter to begin a statutory analysis with the statute's text, 
and to seek legislative history only when the text is not plain. See 
id. at 626. Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook 
are two of the most notable new textualists. See generally Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. ON. L. REV. 849 (1989) 
[hereinafter, Scalia, Originalism]; Easterbrook, Domains, supra 
note 16; Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, II HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59 (1988) 
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Original Intent]; Frank Easterbrook, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119 (1998) 
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Textualism]; Scalia, Common-law 
Courts, supra note 119; Scalia, Rules, supra note 16. 
131 Easterbrook, Domains, supra note 16, at 537, 544. 
132 See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 655 (citing Justice Scalia's 
concurring opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. 
Ct.1981,1994(1989)). 
133 See id. at 651. 
134 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 16-17. 
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D. The Theoretical Battle About Legislative History 
The philosophical war among the purposivists, 
intentionalists, and textualists is actually an academic battle 
over the use of legislative history in statutory 
construction. 135 Between the purposivists and 
intentionalists, the battle concerns what the interpreter 
should seek in legislative history - purpose or intent. 136 
The dispute between the purposivists and intentionalists 
on one hand and the textualists on the other stems from 
the latter's general disdain for any reliance on legislative 
history.137 The arguments for and against these three camps 
are well stated. Beginning with purposivism, the 
problematic nature of a successful quest for legislative 
purpose, especially through legislative history, negates any 
sole reliance on this method. This is because, for the most 
part, legislative purpose may be neither rational nor unitary. 
A statute's purpose may be as reasonable as a lobbyist's 
desires, or as divisive as the ideological or political camps 
of legislators. While, for example, Congress may 
sometimes aspire to a unitary goal, it is no gainsaying that 
it may also produce 535 individual goals that might be 
difficult to coordinate. 138 As noted by one commentator, 
"[y]ou couldn't [even] gettwo-thirds of[] Congress to 
vote for the Ten Commandments." 139 Thus, Congress may 
not in fact produce purposive statutes; 140 "[t]he complex 
compromises endemic in the political process suggest that 
legislation is frequently a congeries of different and 
sometimes conflicting purposes."141 This makes a statutory 
135 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Sacratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv.4, 18 (1998). 
136 See generally Radin, supra note 93. 
IJ7 See generally Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119. 
138 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND POLICIES 
34 (2d ed. 1995). 
139 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting the 
comment of one interviewee in the author's survey). 
140 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 334. 
141 See id. at 335. 
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interpreter's dependence on legislative purpose an exercise 
in futility. 
More challenging than the search for legislative 
purpose, however, is the search for intent. The subjective 
nature of intent, and the multiplicity of congressional intent, 
makes it problematic for even a veteran statutory interpreter 
to succeed in its extrication. While the intent of some 
legislators in including a particular provision in a statute 
may be that they actually believed in the provision, other 
legislators may have simply decided to avoid a filibuster. 142 
Therefore, as Professors Eskridge and Frickey noted, any 
reliance on actual or conventional search for a provision's 
legislative intent may lead to indeterminate results. 143 Judge 
Posner's imaginative reconstruction is similarly flawed. Its 
assumption that thejudge could reconstruct the past 
understanding of a prior legislature does not account for 
the individual biases that may infiltrate the judge's view of 
that history. 144 Additionally, the method neglects any social 
change that may have taken place subsequent to the 
statute's enactment, as to devalue the particular legislature's 
previous understanding. 145 In all, such imaginative 
reconstruction, with a noisy ring of subjectivity, works little 
or no trick to change what is actually a mere record of 
political quibbles into a judicious approach to construction. 
The textualists' qualms with purposivism and 
intentionalism do not end with the points above. Instead, 
they vigorously project the disregard for legislative history. 
To be sure, they rely adamantly on a statute in question, 
even for a context. 146 They search through a statute's 
structure and through other similar statutes for the statute's 
legislative intent. 147 A reliance on legislative history, 
142 For an excellent discussion of how Congress works, see 
generally CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989). 
143 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 328. 
144 See id. at 330. 
145 See id. at 330-31. 
146 See Easterbrook, Domains, supra note 16, at 544-46. Sfle 
generally Eskridge, supra note 121, at 655. 
147 See id. 
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according them, gives judges an unlimited power to 
manipulate a statute. 148 For, "under the guise or even 
delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, 
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives 
and desires, extending their proclivities from the common 
law to the statutory field. "149 
To the textualists, such judicial activism is 
unconstitutional and must not be encouraged through the 
acceptance oflegislative history as an interpretative tool. 1 50 
But, as noted earlier, and would be argued further below, 
this criticism is myopic. It overlooks the nature of American 
codes, which sometimes require the judge to view beyond 
the text of a statute. It also ignores the fact that the 
enforcement of a legislative mandate is more probable with 
an understanding of the process of formulating that 
mandate, than with an academic reliance on the uniformity 
of grammatical rules. In fact, to dismiss legislative intent 
or purpose is tantamount to giving judges the latitude to 
engage unconstitutionally injudiciallegislation. This is 
especially so as any intent garnered from an attenuated 
text (because a statutory text becomes attenuated if 
unclear) negates the respect for legislative supremacy. 
After all, if the legislators had expressed their intent clearly 
through the text, it is unlikely that both the lawyers and the 
trial judge would miss it. Otherwise, the intent is not that 
clear, but is what an individual judge infers. 
The textualist argument against judicial activism is 
flawed primarily because of an erroneous definition, and a 
misplaced demonization, of such activism. Judicial activism, 
to the textualists, occurs when the judge discards the 
statutory text and relies on legislative history to arrive at a 
preferred result. 1 5 1 This, indeed, borders on a violation of 
the judge's oath of office. Judicial activism, contrary to 
the textualists' definition, is actually a judge's attempt to 
balance justice with the respect for legislative supremacy. 152 
148 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 17-18. 
1491d. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See infra Part IV. 
Passivity in statutory interpretation - what I calljudicial 
zombism - is foreign to the American conunon-law root, 
and disharmonious with the institutional notion of justice. 
Judicial stewardship must not be a passive participation in 
constitutional democracy. Textualism is simply judicial 
passivity, akin to ignoring the distress calls of a crime victim 
upon the robotic view that you are not a police officer. 
These issues will now be explored in detail. 
IV. JUDICIAL PASSIVITY 
A. Brogan v. United States: 153 A Case-note of 
Judicial Passivity 
A classic example of judicial passivity is the Supreme 
Court's modem construction of the False Statements 
Accountability Act. 154 In Brogan, the Court construed 
153 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998). 
154 18 U.S.c. § 100 I (2000). Section 100 1 (a) currently states: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 
Government of the United States, knowingly and 
willfully-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, 
or device a material fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing 
the same to contain any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudu lent statement or entry; shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both." 
First enacted in 1863, the predecessor to § 100 1 was intended to 
curb fraudulent claims with government agencies. See Brogan, 
118 S. Ct. at 813. In 1934, Congress broadened the statute to 
include its present language, which goes beyond claims or 
statements that are made to defraud the government. See id. As 
a result of this expansion by Congress, the government has used 
the statute to prosecute a wide range of defendants. See id. 
Federal prosecutors have typically relied on § 100 I to 
bring charges against individuals for any false statements to 
federal agents. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What 
Statements Fall Within Exculpatory Denial Exception to 
Prohibition, Under 18 u.s. CA. § 1001, Against Knowing and 
Willfully Making False Statement Which is Material to Matter 
Within Jurisdiction of Department or Agency of United States, 
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§ 1 00 1 of the Act as proscribing the denial of an accusation 
by federal agents that one has obtained a bribe, even where 
102 A.L.R. FED. 742 (1991). The statute, even in its currenttext, 
does not seem to distinguish voluntary from responsive false 
statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 100 I (a)(2) (2000). Accordingly, courts 
have applied it to both situations. See Thomas, supra, at 742. 
Moreover, in contrast to the 1893 Act that applied to only filed 
false claims, the broad language of § 1001 does not differentiate 
between verbal and written statements. See id. Thus, courts 
tended to apply it to both types of statements. 
The Supreme Court first examined the scope of § 100 I 
(formerly, 18 U.S.c. § 80) in UnitedStatesv. Gilliland 312 U.S. 86 
(\ 941). Gilliland involved several defendants who willfully and 
fraudulently reported inaccurate amounts of petroleum produced 
from certain oil wells. See id. at 87. The Court rejected the argument 
that § 1001 applied to only those matters in which the'government 
had a financial or proprietary interest. See id. at 93. The court, 
tracing the legislative history of the statute, noted that the statute 
resulted from Congress's answer to the call by the Interior 
Secretary as to the serious problem of fraudulent claims, 
particularly in the 1934 era. However, Congress later broadened 
the statute to include all false statements made to government 
agents. See id. Instead, the Court observed that the statute was 
intended to "protect the authorized functions of governmental 
departments and agencies from perversion which might result 
from ... deceptive practices." [d. 
Subsequent to Gilliland, prosecutions under § 100 1 
broadened in scope. See Giles A. Birch, Comment, False 
Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory 
No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273 (1990) (arguing that courts should 
dismiss § 100 1 charges if agents induce lies from suspects). In 
1953, federal prosecutors brought, for the first time, § 1001 charges 
against a defendant for merely lying to federal agents in the course 
of an investigation. See United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. 
Colo. 1953). In Levin, the defendant was convicted for lying to 
FBI agents in the course of investigating the defendant for a 
stolen emerald ring. See id. After Levin, several defendants were 
prosecuted for lying to federal agents. See Birch,.id. at 1276. 
These prosecutions subsequently extended to mere denials of 
wrongdoing. See id. 
As a result ofthe potential for abuse and injustice, many 
federal judges were troubled by how broadly § 1001 was applied. 
See id. at 1279. This was especially so as § 1001 prosecutions 
raised two serious issues: departure from the original intent of 
the statute, and the near violation of the Fifth Amendment. See 
id. Thus, in 1962, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 
1962), formulated the "exculpatory no" doctrine. See Birch, id. at 
1280. The doctrine became a defense to § 1001 charges, excusing 
the mere false denial of wrongdoing. See generally Paternostro, 
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the Government has not yet proven such a crime. 155 . The 
Court ruled that § 100 I did not exclude a mere denial of 
wrongdoing.156 The Court rejected the "exculpatory no" 
doctrine as not within the text of § 100 1.157 In so holding, 
the Court overruled those past decisions embracing the 
"exculpatory no" doctrine. 158 
By abrogating the "exculpatory no" doctrine as'a 
defense to § 100 1 charges, the Court has undone more 
than forty years of restricting the broad language of the 
statute. 159 The Court's decision hence refurbishes the 
problems that prompted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. 
Without any limitations on its reach, § 100 1 presents two-
311 F.2d 298. With this doctrine, statements made by the accused 
to exculpate themselves, whether later proven to be false or not, 
were not indictable. Following the Fifth Circuit, seven other circuits 
adopted the doctrine. The Fifth Circuit, however, in 1994, 
abrogated the doctrine. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 
F.3d 1040(1994). 
155 See Brogan, 118 S.Ct. at 807. Brogan was convicted for lying to 
federal agents from the Department of Labor and the Internal 
Revenue Service. See id. He was an officer of a union that 
represented workers of JRD Management Corporation in New 
York ("JRO"). See id. He was alleged to have collected some 
cash or gifts (bribe) from JRD. See id. Federal agents went to his 
home to question him about the bribe. See id. While there, they 
asked him if he received cash from JRD. He replied "no." See id. 
Unknown to him, the agents had, before going to his home, 
obtained some records showing that he received the money in 
question. See id. Hence, after he denied receiving the money, the 
agents produced the records, and advised him that it was a federal 
offense to lie to agents. See id. at 808. Brogan was subsequently 
charged and convicted under the False Statement Act in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See 
id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed Brogan's conviction. See id. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. See id. The Court, Justice Scalia writing, affirmed 
Brogan's conviction. See id. 
156 See Brogan, 118 S Ct. at 809. 
157 See id. 
158 See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). 
159 See Birch, supra note 153, at 1277. 
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layered chances for prosecuting the unwary suspect. 160 
To assure a conviction, federal investigators could simply 
engineer a mere denial of wrongdoing that may very well 
derive from a suspect's fear of self-incrimination. As noted 
by one commentator, "the authority to force suspects to 
admit their guilt either by words or silence, is an lUlusual 
power in the hands of an investigative agent."161 This is an 
absurdity, and the potential for prosecutorial abuse is 
enormous. Equally striking is the court's belated loss of 
confidence in its earlier acquiescence in the "exculpatory 
no" doctrine. Although the Court has had ample 
opportilllities to abolish the "exculpatory no" doctrine, I 62 
it waited more than forty years to do SO.163 The Court's 
ruling raises several questions regarding approaches to 
statutory construction. 
Justice Scalia did not see any need to deviate from 
what he interpreted as Congress's command through the 
text of § 100 1.164 According to Justice Scalia, the text, as 
applied to Brogan's situation, was lUlambiguous. 165 It 
categorically proscribed giving "any false statement of 
whatever kind" to a federal investigator. 166 In falsely 
answering "no" to the agents' question, in Justice Scalia's 
view, Brogan made a false statement within the purview 
of § 100 l.167 Whether that statement amounted to a mere 
denial of wrongdoing was irrelevant. This was because 
there was nothing in § 100 1 that excused a mere denial of 
160 See id. 
16~ See id. at 1287. 
162 See id. 
163 Particularly notable is the fact that the Court's decision comes 
four years after the Fifth Circuit, which originated the "exculpatory 
no" doctrine, rejected the doctrine. See United States v. Rodriguez-
Rios, 14F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994). 
164 See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809. 
165 See id. at 808. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. at 809. 
wrongdoing. 168 Thus, the "exculpatory no" doctrine 
departed from the statute's text. 169 Again, relying on the 
text, Justice Scalia also rejected the contention that § 1001 
was meant to punish only those statements that perverted 
governmental functions. 170 
Justice Scalia's analysis is consistent with the textualist 
approach to statutory construction. As a professed 
textualist, he would not "restrict the unqualified language 
of[§ 1001] to the particular evil that Congress was trying 
to remedy."171 To do so, would "render democratically 
adopted texts mere springboards for judicial 
lawmaking."I72 This position reiterates his view that the 
Court ought to interpret the law as Congress enacted it. 173 
Even when a judge perceives the broader social purposes 
a statute serves, the judge has no authority to fill the gap 
that may exist in the statute's text. 174 Otherwise, the judge 
would be making, not interpreting, the law. 175 Therefore, 
according to Justice Scalia, the legislative intent of § 1001 
is irrelevant, because the text is plain and unambiguous. 176 
The argument above is forceful. There is nothing 
illogical about assuming that a statute means what its text 
conveys. One should ordinarily have faith in the legislature 
to draft clear and unambiguous law. A statute's meaning 
should naturally come from its text. Section 1001 seems 
clear from its text. The meaning that Jllstice Scalia ascribes 
to it is reasonable. 177 When closely examined, however, 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
1711d. 
172 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 17. 
173 See id.; see also supra Part III. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 See Brogan, 118 S.Ct. at 809. 
177 It must be reasonable for six of nine justices to agree with 
Justice Scalia. 
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Justice Scalia's reading is not the only reasonable reading 
of § 1001. Despite what the textualists may think, 
congressional grammar is not as perfect as one would 
anticipate. Although it is a good idea to follow Justice 
Scalia's advice and apply the meaning that "a wise and 
intelligent person" I 78 ascribes to § 1001 ,judges possess 
different levels of wisdom and intelligence. As such, the 
textualist approach becomes "as open to arbitrary judicial 
discretion and expansion as the use oflegislative intent, or 
other interpretive methods, if the text-mindedjudge is so 
inclined." I 79 
A text is amenable to different interpretations, and, 
thus, manipulable. The Court's decision in Hubbard v. 
United States I 80 buttresses this point. In Hubbard,181 an 
opinion in which Justice Scalia concurred, 182 the Court 
reversed how it originally interpreted § 1001 in United 
States v. Bramblett. 18) The issue in Bramblett was the 
meanings of "department" and "agency" in § 1001.184 The 
Bramblett Court concluded that these words meant all 
branches of the government. I 85 Forty years later, the Court 
was not so sure. Although nothing about these words in § 
1001 changed to show them in a different light, the 
Hubbard Court ruled that "department," as used in this 
section, excluded the judiciary.186 Thus, the Court 
recognized the ')udicial function" exception to § 1001.187 
178 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 18. 
179 Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Scalia, Common-law Courts, 
supra note 119, at 63. 
180 514 U.S. 695 (1995). 
181 See id. at 706. 
182 See id. at 716 (Scalia, 1., concurring). 
183 348 U.S. 503 (1955). 
184 See id. at 504. 
185 See id. at 509. 
186 Hubbard, 514 U.S. at714. 
187 See id at 709-11. 
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The Court saw Bramblett as a seriously flawed decision, 
because "the Bramblett Court made no attempt to 
reconcile its interpretation with the usual meaning of 
department." 188 The problem with this reasoning is 
precisely why the vacuous reading of a text is flawed. As 
Justice Scalia stated in Hubbard, the potential for mischief 
is great in a mistaken reading. 189 Why, for example, did 
the Hubbard Court interpret "department" to exclude the 
judiciary? What is usual about this definition? 
Most often, a statutory text is not as plain as it appears 
at first blush. Justice Scalia, in Brogan, interpreted the 
text, "any false statement" to mean all false statements, 
including a "no" response to a question. 190 However, when 
read with the word, "makes," the phrase, "any false 
statement" excludes a responsive pleading, as in defendant 
Brogan's one-word denial of wrongdoing. Although a 
statement may mean "that which is stated ... in words of 
facts or opinions,"191 the word "make" is susceptible to a 
wide range of interpretations, all of which suggest an 
affirmative act. l92 Even Justice Scalia has in the past 
concurred in such an "affirmative" definition. In Patterson 
v. MacLean Credit Union,193 he joined Justice Kennedy 
in holding that the phrase "to make" meant "to form." 
Whereas, the dictionary defines "form" in at least forty-
one ways, the most relevant of which means "to construct 
1881d. at 702 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For its "usual" meaning of "department," the Court relied primarily 
on how 18 U.S.C. § 6 defined that word, see id. at 700, even 
though it faulted the Bramblett Court for relying on 18 U .S.C. § 
287 (the so-called statutory cousin of section 100 I), see id. at 702-
703 (a part of the majority opinion in which Justice Scalia 
concurred). 
189 See id. at 7 I 6. 
190 Brogan, I 18 S.Ct. at 808. 
191 See id. at 807 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
246 I (2d ed. 1950)). 
192 See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 820 (1992 
ed.). 
193 491 U.S. 164(1989). 
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or frame (ideas, opinions, etc) in the mind."194 These words 
are not derivative but initiative in nature. The usual195 
meaning of "make" in Brogan's situation, therefore, was 
the initiative act of doing, not the reactive or defensive one 
of responding. To be sure, the word "no" is used normally 
with a comparative;196 it is a negative response (a 
derivative). So, even ifit is a "statement," it is not the 
affirmative declaration required by § 100 1. 
The terms "knowingly and willingly," and the apparent 
flavor of § 100 1, fortify the argument above. 197 Although 
Brogan conceded "knowingly and willfully" responding to 
the agents' question, 198 these words show how disputable 
the Court's interpretation is of "making a false statement" 
under § 100 1. The word "knowingly" underscores the 
fact that § 100 1 does not apply to all false statements. 
What if the question to Brogan was whether he received 
"a bribe," as opposed to receiving some cash? In that 
case, for "no" to be a false response, he must know that 
receiving some cash translates into receiving "a bribe." 
But, is whether one received a bribe not a triable issue for 
the jury to decide? For Brogan, therefore, to knowingly 
answer falsely, he would have had to be his ownjury, as 
the federal agents already are his judges. This questionable 
result becomes clearer when one considers the word 
"willfully." 
To "willfully" make a statement is to volunteer or 
take the initiative to declare words off acts or opinion. 199 
A constructive duress contaminates such element of will 
in a criminal investigative circumstance. It is unlikely that 
one "willfully" responds to a federal agent's inculpatory 
question, especially when one does not fully appreciate 
the right to remain silent in that situation. Little wonder the 
statute does not state, "whoever knowingly and willfully 
194 See Webster's, supra note 192, at 523. 
19S Relying on the Court's reasoning in Hubbard. 
196 See Webster's, supra note 192, at 9 I 9. 
197 See Brogan, I 18 S.Ct at 807. 
198 See id. 
199 See Webster's, supra note 192, at 1524. 
responds." The literal reading of the text, therefore, does 
not furnish a complete understanding of § 1001. 
B. Rethinking Justice Scalia's New Textualism 
The textualist approach to statutory construction is 
appealing in many respects. A statute's text is the most 
relevant evidence of its command. The out-of-text 
statements by legislators, presented to support the truth 
of a statute must be excluded as "legislative hearsay." 
Because such congressional statements, for the most part, 
are not consensual, they lack constitutional legitimacy. 
They may also be susceptible to judicial manipulation. As 
observed in the preceding section, Justice Scalia clutches 
to this rationale as the basis for his brand of textualism. 200 
This projection is consistent with his shift in focus from the 
formalist argument that textualism is consistent with the 
separation-of-powers principle to the functionalist attitude 
that it curtails judicial legislation. 201 
The main appeal of textual ism, however, is the 
predictability and uniformity that is achievable by limiting 
judicial decisions to statutory text. For, as Justice Scalia 
notes, when the judge's interpretative job goes beyond 
the textual rule oflaw, there exists the danger that "equality 
of treatment is difficult to demonstrate ... predictability is 
destroyed [and] judicial arbitrariness is facilitated ... "202 
Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States. 203 
In that case, the Court construed a statute that made 
it "unlawful for any person ... to ... in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration of any alien ... 
into the United States ... to perform labor or service of 
any kind . ... "204 The issue was whether the Holy Trinity 
200 See supra Part III (C). 
201 See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 656; see also Roger Colinvaux, 
What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging 
Under Textualist Lens, 72 IND. LJ. 1133 (1997) (analyzing the 
efficacy of the textual ist approach to statutory interpretation). 
202 Scalia, Rules, supra note 16, at 1175. 
20) 143 V.S.457 (1892). 
204 Id at 458. 
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Church violated this provision when it brought arninister 
into the United States.205 The statute, in another section, 
exempted certain occupations but did not exempt 
ministers.206 Yet the Court ruled that Congress did not 
intend to prohibit ministers from coming into the country 
when it enacted the statute, citing congressional records.207 
This is so, according to Justice Brewer, because the United 
States was a Christian nation that would not exclude 
ministers from its shores.2os 
Although it has been suggested that Justice Brewer's 
religious background influenced his opinion in Holy 
Trinity,209 his reliance more on congressional records than 
on a seemingly clear text is remarkable. Even for ardent 
followers oflegislative history, Justice Brewer's use of 
congressional records to support his "Christian nation" 
rationale in Holy Trinity borders on judicial politicking. 
The textualist argument, therefore, is reasonable in such a 
situation. There may be times when judges go too far in 
using legislative history. These judges "run the risk of 
imposing their own notion of public interest upon the inferred 
purpose of the language they interpret."210 The risk is 
heightened when the majority of judges in the particular 
COUlt share the same social, religious or political views. 
The result may be judicial legislation, removed from 
statutory construction. This problem, however, is not 
peculiar to the use oflegislative history. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. at 458-59. 
201 See id at 465. The Court, relying on committee reports, noted a 
difference between "brain toilers," a category to which ministers 
belonged, and "manual laborers," the importation of whom was 
the "evil" Congress sought to correct through the statute. Id at 
463. 
208 See id. at 466. 
209 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY, at 523, n. 2 (2d. ed. 1995) (pointing to the factthat Justice 
Brewer was a minister's son). 
210 See Russell Holder, Say What You Mean and Mean What You 
Say: The Resurrection of Plain Meaning in California Courts, 
30 V.c. DAVIS L. REV. 569, 586, n. 99 (1997). 
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As noted previously, a statute's text is as manipulable 
as congressional records. To completely ignore a statute's 
history, for a stringent adherence to its text, does not 
account for the danger inherent in the semantic 
manipulation oftext, or erase the differences in how judges 
comprehend the English language. Justice Scalia's brand 
of textual ism is fallacious in three crucial respects. First, it 
erroneously assumes that the English or legal language is 
scientifically precise, and that all judges are bound by the 
same rules of grammar. Second, it flagrantly ignores how 
important context is (or what context is most important) 
to communication, especially statutory communication. 
Lastly, Justice Scalia's personal practice exposes a 
hypocrisy that defeats the textualist claim to judicial 
consistency in statutory interpretation. 
As in Brogan, Justice Scalia's approach confines a 
statute to a narrow-minded universe. It cuts off the head 
and tail of the statute and traps the body in a vacuous 
"text-tube," and then calls for its magical revival via judicial 
lexicology. But, even iflexicology were a science, the 
English language, or the legal language, for that matter, 
does not enjoy the luxury of scientific precision. The idea 
that a disputed text is plain and unambiguous, in a sense, 
invites the view that the lawyers arguing over such a text 
are either poorly educated or engaged in frivolity. At a 
minimum, it suggests the omnipotence of the judicial lens. 
Such an idea disregards the fact that judges often disagree 
as to the plainness of a text. 211 This is especially so as the 
legal language is even more complicated than the ordinary 
English language. Otherwise, there would be no need for 
legal training. Justice Scalia understands this point. Indeed, 
in his Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, he had noted: "[W]e do not normally 
have a lawsuit in front of us if the language of a statute is 
clear. "212 
Justice Scalia understands also that political 
compromises affect a statute's clarity. 213 The problem is 
further complicated when the statute is a social 
legislation.214 When one adds the congressional logistics 
involved in legislating to "any frailty in draftsmanship, and 
the malleability and imperfections of English words, the 
likelihood that one would fmd plain language diminishes 
dramatically."215 The textualists begin to fail when, 
because they denounce extra-textual sources, they so 
readily fmd plain language. 
According to Professor Plaas, Justice Scalia, in his 
textualist approach, is quick to conclude that a provision 
is plain and amenable mainly because he defines "plain" in 
a broad manner.216 The broader he defines "plain," the 
narrower the chances that a provision is vague or 
ambiguous.217 By avoiding the conclusion of vagueness 
and ambiguity, "he rationalizes his reliance on interpretive 
devices that may not have been considered or relied on in 
the legislative process."218 This leads him to a result-
oriented analysis.219 In other words, he more easily 
manipulates the text of a provision. Take, for example, 
his dissenting opinion in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Communities for a Greater Oregon.220 The issue in 
213 See Stephen A. Plaas, The Illusion and Allure ofTextualism, 
40 YILL. L. REv. 93, 105 (1995) (commenting on Justice Scalia's 
dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 
616,67 I (1986». In that case, Justice Scalia said: "To make matters 
worse, [the majority] assays the current Congress' [s] desires with 
respect to the particular provision in isolation, rather than (the 
way the provision was originally enacted) as part of a total 
legislative package containing many quids pro quo" (emphasis 
added). See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 67 I . 
214 Plaas, supra note 2 I 3, at 105. 
2151d. 
216 See id. at 106. 
211 One need only sift through the Supreme Court's opinions in 217 See id. 
the past two years to understand that a statute's plainness is in 
the eyes of the beholder. 218/d. 
212 Confirmation Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 219 See id. 
99th Congo 65 (I 986)(statement of Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court 
nominee). 22°515U.S.687(J995). 
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Babbit was the logical construction of the Endangered 
Species Act.221 Section 9 of the Act prohibits a person 
from "taking" a species.222 The question for the Court 
was what the Act meant by "take." The Act defines 
"take" to include "harm," but does not define the latter.223 
The Department ofInterior, in its regulations of fish and 
wildlife services, defines "hann" to include the modification 
ofthe species' habitat in a way that injures or kills members 
of the species.224 The Court considered whether this 
definition was correct.m To answer this question, the 
Court relied on its analysis in Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. 
NRDC. 226 
The Court found the word "take" to be ambiguous 
and so deferred to the agency.227 The majority, relying on 
the Act's legislative history and the ordinary meaning of 
"harm," adopted the agency's definition.228 Justice Scalia, 
221 !d. at 690. 
m The Endangered Species Act specifically provides: "[W]ith 
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife ... it is 
unlawful for any person ... to ... (B) take any such species within 
the United States ... " 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988& Supp.). 
22J Section 3( 19) defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt to 
engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (emphasis 
added). 
224 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (\ 994). 
m Babbit, SIS U.S. at 690. 
226 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron stands for the proposition that 
courts would construe an ambiguous statute as the governmental 
agency that enforces the statute construes it. Thus: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency 
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Jd. at 843-44. 
227 Babbit, SIS U.S. at 690. 
228 See id. 
Articles 
on the other hand, did not find any ambiguity in the 
provision, and, therefore, saw no need to defer to the 
agency. He relied, instead, on such interpretive devices 
as the dictionary, Blackstone commentaries and statements 
by the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service.229 He 
then construed "take" not to include "harm" as defined in 
the agency's regulations. Instead, "take" and "harm," 
according to him, fell within "the sense of affirmative 
conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal 
or animals," not the indirect action of modifYing the animal's 
habitat. 230 
One may advance many theories as to why Justice 
Scalia thought that how he defined "harm" in Rabbit was 
the only way to define the word, but none of the theories 
points to the efficacy of the textualist approach. The word 
"harm" in the Rabbit situation is not plain and unambiguous 
but susceptible to many definitions. But, even if one were 
to follow its ordinary meaning, there is nothing 
unreasonable about "harm" being the indirect result of 
modifYing an animal's habitat. 231 An animal is "harmed" 
when one destroys its habitat. It is also harmed when it is 
met by the hunter's bullet. The point is that, without an 
appropriate context, a seemingly plain word may be lost 
in a semantic war, which war the textualists use vigorously 
to avoid legislative history. 
On most occasions, Justice Scalia finds his context 
in statutory words.232 When the words do not furnish 
sufficient context, he resorts to the Whole-Act Rule, and 
finds context in other parts ofthe statute that use similar 
229 See id. at 717-721. 
230 See id. at 720. 
231 This is even more reasonable than Justice Scalia's interpretation 
of "willingly making a false statement" to include the derivative 
"no" answer in Brogan. 
2J2 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 23. 
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words.233 This approach is problematic, because the idea 
that one can rely on the context furnished by a confusing 
act is self-defeating. Moreover, the Whole-Act Rule is 
nothing more than a backdoor to legislative intent. The 
idea is to get the whole act's flavor as to how the act 
addresses what it is meant to address, so as to find a 
provision's proper meaning.234 This doubly processed 
legislative intent should not be as forceful as that found in 
congressional records. 
The textualist approach assumes that words maintain 
an independent existence. But words are alive only to the 
extent of the dynamics between the speaker and the 
perceiver. To quote Professor Plaas, "judges should not 
be free to read the notes of a song written by Congress 
without listening to the music."235 While it is rational to 
construe a statute according to its text, Justice Scalia's 
textualism ignores the fact that "words are not pebbles in 
alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; 
and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the 
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the 
setting in which they were used .... "236 
Justice Scalia's argument against legislative context 
is that it is not reliable, and it creates the danger of')udicial 
freewheeling."23? As to unreliability, he cites the fact that, 
most often, legislators are not well versed in a statute's 
text because they neither write the actual law nor pay 
2JJ The idea of the Whole Act Rule is that each section of a 
statute should be interpreted in the context of the whole act. See 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 644-645 ("The key to the 
whole act approach is ... that all provisions and other features of 
the enactment must be given force, and provisions must be 
interpreted so as not to derogate from the force of other provisions 
and features of the whole statute."). 
234 See id. 
235 Plaas, supra note 213, at 127. 
236 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 342, n. 81 (relying on 
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278, 281 n.6 
(1988), quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 
1941». 
237 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 34. 
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attention when such is read on the floor of the House.238 
This "congressional passivity" argument, however, neither 
makes up for the textualists' sole or enormous reliance on 
statutory text, nor rights a ')udicial passivity." If the history 
of a law cannot be trusted to shed light on the law, why 
should the language of the law be trusted? As to judicial 
freewheeling, that danger also permeates the textualist 
approach. As noted above,judges do not follow uniform 
rules of grammar. In fact, Brogan's reading of § 1001 
derives from the majority's (more specifically, Justice 
Scalia's) semantic freewheeling. Hence, if the majority is 
wrong in interpreting § 1001, a new law is made, and the 
textualists' fear of judicial freewheeling is nevertheless 
realized. 
Philosophical and literary theories indicate that 
universal objectivity in statutory interpretation is an illusion, 
because the interpreter's perspective will always mingle 
with the text.239 Judicial philosophy is ordinarily governed 
by individual social, political and economic ideologies.240 
To be sure, Justice Scalia's grammatical compass (and, 
so, his textual ism) is more often influenced by his 
conservative ideology than his textualist fellowship.241 As 
such, he is notoriously guilty of judicial freewheeling. On 
many occasions, Justice Scalia has deviated from his 
textualism, but very cleverly presents his opinions in a 
textualist shell. 242 His "textualist malpractice" is most 
2J8 See id. at 32-33. 
239 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 343. 
240 See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on 
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (I 998)(examining the factors that influence 
judges to decide cases the way they do); see also Plaas, supra 
note 213, at 128-130. Professor Plaas correctly notes the Supreme 
Court's ideological make-up as to the division between "liberal," 
"moderate," and "conservative" justices. He points out that, "to 
the extent that a Justice is controlled by precast views, the 
likelihood of truly objective decision-making is reduced to an 
illusion." !d. 
241 See id. (arguing that Justice Scalia's opinion is motivated by 
his conservative politics). 
242 See generally id. (discussing generally Justice Scalia's 
inconsistencies in applying the textualist methods; what Professor 
Plaas calls "textualist malpractice"). 
obvious in civil-rights and environmental-law cases, 
especially cases that affect disadvantaged litigants.243 An 
example of this point is his opinion in Independent Fed'n 
of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, where the meaning of § 
706(k) of Title VII was in contest.244 
The issue in Zipes was whether the plaintiffs could 
recover attorney's fees from losing intervenors.245 Section 
706(k) provided that "a court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fees as 
part of the costS."246 One would expect this text to be 
plain to Justice Scalia. This time, however, Justice Scalia 
deviated from his textualist tradition, and was quick to 
find ambiguity in the text. 247 Hence, uncharacteristically, 
he not only looked to such extrinsic evidence as the 
American legal position that winners are not entitled to 
fees from losers,248 but also relied on legislative history.249 
He held that plaintiffs could not recover attorney's fees 
under his reading of § 706(k), "in light of the competing 
equities that Congress normally takes into account," and 
since his reading furthered "congressional policy in favor 
of 'vigorous ' adversary proceedings. "250 To the proponent 
oflegislative history in statutory construction, this sounds 
awfully familiar. 
243 See id. 
244 491 U.S. 754 (1989). See Plaas, supra note213, at III, for an 
excellent discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion in Zipes. 
245 Zipes, 491 U.S. at 755. 
246 See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) (1988» (emphasis added). 
247 Justice Scalia had, in other cases, found "plain" texts that were 
muddier than § 706(k). See Rabbit, where Justice Scalia found 
that ESA' s language was plain even when "harm" was not defined 
in the act, and was subject to several meanings. Additionally, he 
had on at least one occasion stated that Title VII was "a model of 
statutory draftsmanship." See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title 
VII is so clear as to be against affirmative action). 
248 See Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758. 
249 See id. at 761. 
250Id. at 761-766. 
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Another striking example of where Justice Scalia 
uncharacteristically deviated from his textualist approach 
is Lukhard v. Reed.251 The Court in Lukhard decided 
the issue of whether, pursuant to the Aids to Families with 
Dependent Children Act (AFDC),252 a personal injury 
award was "income" or "resources," for the purpose of 
assessing eligibility for benefits under the Act.253 The word 
"income" ordinarily connotes gain or profit. 254 A personal 
injury award is not commonly understood as a gain or a 
profit but a financial attempt to put the plaintiff in his or her 
original position.255. Yet Justice Scalia ignored the 
dictionary and common usage (textual devices), and, 
instead, opted for legislative intent.256 He couched this 
reliance on legislative intent in textual terms, holding that, 
because other statutes excluded personal injury awards 
from income, congressional silence as to the AFDC statute 
showed Congress's intent to include such awards in an 
applicant's income pool.257 He also relied on post-
enactment statements ofthose involved in passing the 
statute.258 
251 481 U.S. 368 (1987). 
252 See 42 U.S.C §§ 601-615 (1988). 
253 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at373. 
254 The respondents refen'ed to the dictionary, a resource which 
Justice Scalia frequently uses in his textualist approach. See id. at 
375. 
255 To be sure, personal injury awards are not "income" for tax 
purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)( 1999& Supp.). Seegenera/ly 
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety o/Taking Income Tax 
Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or 
Death Action, 16 A.L.R.4th 589 (1982). 
256 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376. 
257 As Professor Plaas notes, "he allowed congressional silence 
to trump text, common usage and similar schemes." Plaas, supra 
note 213, at I 19. The respondents in Lukhard had, among other 
definitions, utilized the IRC's definition of "income" in 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a)(1988). See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376. 
258 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 378. In his discussion of Lukhard, 
Professor Plaas correctly notes that Justice Scalia had, in another 
case, rejected the type of post-enactment statements he relied on 
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Apart from the two cases above, Professor Plaas 
lists at least four other cases in which Justice Scalia's 
deviation from textualism is so flagrant that his decisions 
are irreconcilable.259 These decisions expose the fact that 
Justice Scalia's textual ism may be motivated by other 
considerations than consistency, predictability and judicial 
restraint. His socio-political ideology is a logical suspect. 
This is supported by the fact that even when he agrees 
with the so-called liberal Justices, he goes out of his way 
to distance his opinions from theirs by hiding under different 
issues. In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. 
Guerra,260 for example, the issue was whether California 
law providing special protections for pregnant female 
employees discriminated against men, pursuant to Title VII, 
which prohibits employment discrimination based on 
sex.261 Justice Scalia, even while agreeing with Justice 
Marshall in answering this question in the negative, 
contended that the Court should have limited its analysis 
to the preemption issue also raised in the case.262 This is 
a suspicious reasoning because preemption was not really 
in Lukhard. See Plaas, supra note 213, at 119 (referring to Pittston 
Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988), where Justice Scalia, 
at 118-19, said: "[s]ince such statements cannot possibly have 
informed the vote ofthe legislators who earlier enacted the law, 
there is no more basis for considering them than there is to conduct 
post-enactment polls of the original legislators"). 
259 See Plaas, supra note 213, at 112-121. 
260 479 U.S. 272 (1986). 
261 See id. at 274. Title VII states: 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin ... (emphasis added). 
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1994). 
262 See id. at 280. 
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a strong contention in that case.263 One may wonder if 
Justice Scalia was trying to avoid sanctioning the ruling in 
United Steel Workers of America v. Weber,264 a decision 
that he had vigorously argued to be overturned.265 
For Justice Scalia, like those judges who seek to 
hide their judicial politicking, textualism presents a 
principled front. It offers a cherubic mask of judicial 
neutrality. While judges who rely on a statute's text appear 
detached from politics, those who use legislative history 
are more likely to expose their political biases. The 
textualists appear consistent and neutral because an opinion 
couched in textual tenns very effectively masks the writer's 
underlining ideological biases. 
v. CONTEXTUAL ACTIVISM 
Brogan is a typical example of where dogged 
adherence to statutory text leads to jurisprudential 
absurdity. While a false exculpatory statement may seem 
to fit in the text of § 1001, the majority's literal interpretation 
is judicial passivity, if not jurisprudential zombism, far from 
the common sense of justice.266 As Justice Stevens 
correctly noted, even though § 1001 can literally be read 
to prohibit false statements by federal undercover agents 
263 See id. 
264 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
265 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 1472 (Scalia, J., disenting) (criticizing 
the Court's decision in Weber). Weber addressed a similar issue 
to that in Guerra. The issue in Weber was whether, under Title 
VII, an employer's affirmative-action program (concerning 
employee training and promotion) for black employees amounted 
to discrimination against a white employee. See Weber, 443 U.S. 
at 196. The Court answered this question in the negative, holding 
that such a voluntary and temporary measure geared towards 
correcting the historical discrimination against black employees, 
even when race-conscious, was not prohibited by Title VII. See 
id. at 208. At the time of Weber, Justice Scalia was not on the 
Supreme Court, but upon joining the Court, he has been relentless 
in arguing (as he did in Johnson) that Weber should be overruled. 
For such a committed textualist, you would expect Justice Scalia 
to consistently find the text of Title VII to be plain in its prohibition 
of employment discrimination, whether based on sex or race. 
266 Justice Scalia confuses "justice," which should always inform 
judicial decisions, with "writ[ing] into our law [a] species of 
compassion inflation." See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810. 
to drug traffickers,267 it is not likely that the Court would 
subscribe to such a construction.268 Justice Stevens was 
also correct when he observed that the majority's analysis 
wrongfully deviated from a well-established principle that 
counsels against applying a criminal statute where doing 
so would lead to a broader result than Congress 
intended.269 Because it is not unquestionably obvious 
267 Clearly, drug-trafficking is a matter within the jurisdiction of 
the United states. See 21 U .S.C. § 841 (1998). 
268 See Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 817 (Stevens, J, dissenting). The 
Court in the situation described above is very likely to apply a 
policy-driven "government-function" exception to exclude such 
agent's statement from § 100 I. However, a Constitution-driven 
"exculpatory no" exception is also consistent with public policy, 
i.e., the right to be free from constructively or directly coerced 
self-incrimination. Although Justice Scalia contends that "proper 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to 
swear falsely, "See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810 (quoting United 
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980». Silence where that 
right is not well understood is a canard. This is mainly so as the 
Miranda instruction given defendant Brogan was materially 
defective, even though Justice Scalia relies on "the modem age 
of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings" to conclude that 
Brogan understood his rights. The agents told Brogan that "ifhe 
wished to cooperate, he should have an attorney contact the U.S 
Attorney's Office .... " Yet the agents proceeded to question 
him. See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807. 
269 See Brogan, 118 S. ct. at 817. Justice Stevens refers to the Rule 
of Lenity. The Rule of Lenity is a substantive canon of statutory 
interpretation that states that laws that are punitive in purpose 
must be construed strictly. Thus, where a statute does not clearly 
prohibit a conduct, the statute should not be applied to punish a 
violator. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 655-56. Even 
discarding legislative history, Justice Stevens's alternative 
interpretation of § 100 I is consistent with the Rule of Lenity, a 
canon of statutory interpretation with which textualists have no 
qualms. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 (1987) 
("[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, 
one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only 
when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.") 
(emphasis added); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380(1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning ofthe 
language in its textual context; and second, using established 
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication 
that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one 
applies.") (emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia frequently 
avoids applying the Rule of Lenity, because he is quick to find 
Articles 
that § 1001 is intended to punish exculpatory statements, 
since the text is subject to two permissible meanings,270 
the rule oflenity should have been applied to construe the 
statute in favor of the defendant, Brogan. Justice required 
the Brogan Court to choose a restrictive, not Justice 
Scalia's harsh, punitive construction, if indeed the idea is 
to force Congress to clarify § 1001.271 
Although justice does not call for the judicial 
usurpation of legislative authority, statutory construction is 
"something more than judicial passivity." 272 Textualism, 
in fact, promotes the usurpation oflegislative authority. 
At the very least, it promotes injustice. It overlooks the 
fact that statutory construction is an art, not a science.273 
In the alternative, it suggests that such artistry should be 
confined to grammatical creativity, devoid of historical 
context. But one need not rely on the science of etymology 
to understand that the meaning of a word may depend on 
the user's purpose in communicating. The meaning of a 
legal text must not be detached from the "why," as well as 
"plain" language, he assents to the rule where there is reasonable 
doubt as to what a text conveys. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 
508 U.S. 129 (1993) (recognizing thatthe Rule of Lenity may apply 
in certain situations, but finding no need to apply it to the 
petitioner's situation because the word "conviction" in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(l) is unambiguous). 
270 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 380. In fact, not only is there an 
alternative permissible meaning of § 100 I, for more than forty 
years, courts have read the provision to exclude mere denials of 
wrongdoing. See supra Part IV. 
271 See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810 ("The objectors' principal 
grievance [as to the force of § 100 I] ... lies ... with Congress .. 
.. "). In McNally, the court applied the Rule of Lenity and strictly 
construed the mail fraud statute to exclude "depriving another of 
the intangible right of honest service" from the statutory language 
"scheme or artifice to defraud." See McNally, 483 U.S. at 330. The 
Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Scal in, left it up to Congress 
to clarify the statutory language. See id. Congress did so by 
stating that" 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services." See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). See generally Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 209, at 674. 
272 See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 61. 
273 See id. at 15. 
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from the "how" or "what," of the text. A major flaw in 
textualism is that it is one-sided. Its disregard for legislative 
purpose exposes a gap in its foundational projection of 
the separation-of-powers doctrine, and does not accord 
it the constitutional legitimacy that its proponents so desire. 
A. The Role ofthe Judge in an Era of Codes 
As discussed earlier, the nineteenth-century surge to 
codifY American law did not overthrow the common-law 
system. Instead, the resultant code-system was to exist 
alongside, if not employed to facilitate the common law. 
Implicit in this idea is the recognition that law must not 
exist in a vacuum but must be functionally viable to respoQd 
to societal changes. This logic, which has long fueled the 
role of the common-law judge - to apply and develop the 
law in real circumstances - also projects the constitutional 
role ofthe judge in American modem democracy. Even 
with the separation-of-powers doctrine, the common-law 
judge was notto become a juristic invalid, whose legitimate 
posture in policing the majority could easily be thwarted 
by the same majority. To the contrary, the judge's 
constitutional role suggests a judicial activism that must be 
guided by the constitutional duty of protectingjustice, not 
frozen in the formal codification oflegislative enactment. 
This role, however, does not permit the imposition of the 
judge's will on the legislature.274 
The judge has to weigh the quest for justice against 
the respect for legislative supremacy; this is what should 
be understood as judicial activism. On the one hand, the 
judge, in interpreting a statutory provision, must protect 
justice and individual liberty by guarding against 
jurisprudential absurdity. On the other hand, care must 
be taken so that individual will and force may not override 
the legislative expression of a legitimate majoritarian will. 
This is the problem that the common-law judge faces.275 
To solve this problem, the judge must begin with the 
Constitution - the most potent acceptance of majoritarian 
274 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
m See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
1-10(1982). 
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rule by the minority, and the single best protection for the 
minority.276 The judge must use the Constitution as a 
judicial compass in finding and curtailingjurisprudential 
absurdity. But, in a common-law system, the judge must 
not stop with the Constitution. For, where the legislature 
has enacted an unclear statute, "it is the province of the 
courts to liquidate and fix [its] meaning and operation. "277 
The Constitution, though the threshold ofliberty, does 
not complete the quest for justice. The quest for justice is 
intricately linked with the judicial ability to "liquidate" and 
"fix" a bad law, not only to invalidate the law simply on 
constitutional grounds. But, the judge also must perform 
this duty without violating the Constitution, because "[i]t 
can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense 
of repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the 
constitutional intentions of the legislature. "278 The limit of 
the judge's function in "liquidating" and "fixing" a 
problematic statute is the issue one must address. Some 
who engage injudicial passivity try to justifY such a choice 
in terms of judicial restraint and passive virtues.279 The 
basic contention is that the judge must not play too active 
a role in interpreting a statute, as to rely on the political 
origin of the statute in "liquidating" and "fixing" the statute's 
meaning. To evaluate this argument, however, one must 
not ignore the nature of the system within which the judge 
must function. There are two questions that must be 
addressed. First, what is a bad and an unjust law? Second, 
how does the judge liquidate and fix such a law without 
implicating individual will and force at the expense of 
constitutional legitimacy? It is indeed the second question 
that has been the source of much controversy in statutory 
construction, and the main focus of this Article. 
A bad and an unjust law, for purposes of 
interpretation, is one that lacks clear and general 
applicability. That type of law is one whose meaning is 
not apparent from its text, or whose application defeats 
276 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
277 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
278 Jd. 
279 See supra Parts III and IV. For an excellent presentation of the 
arguments, see CALABRESI, supra note 275, at 1-10. 
its purpose because it results in absurdity. Such a law, if 
criminal, promotes what I call a Type-l A Error - punishing 
those whose conducts would not be proscribed by a 
rational majority, but by the law's textual ambiguities.28o 
A law is also bad if it has outlived its usefulness; if its 
enforcement absolutely makes no sense in present society 
- it is an anachronistic law.281 Most bad laws, without 
judicial intervention, result not only in the violation of 
constitutionally stipulated rights but also in the denial of 
fundamental justice, recognizing that justice is a function 
of the times - a function of societal Zeitgeist. These bad 
laws may be the products of inadequate draftsmanship, 
or the consequences of a socio-culturallag. The latter is 
what Judge Calabresi calls "the problem of legal 
obsolescence," which he describes as "the combination 
of the [law's] lack of fit and lack of current legislative 
support."282 Both sources of bad laws are, nevertheless, 
linked to the American codification movement discussed 
earlier. 
As already indicated, the American code-system is 
not perfect. Although today's statutes may be more 
detailed and better drafted than before,283 they still are 
inadequate to require only a passive interpretation. 
Because the codes are not elaborate in stating the legal 
principles that must govern interpretation, they are ravaged 
with gaps. These gaps defy juristic logic, as to oftentimes 
require more than a textual construction. This is so 
regardless of whether these gaps are due to sheer 
inefficiency in drafting, as with the Internal Revenue Code, 
or the unintended result oflegislative logistics, as in the 
case of political compromises. 
280 This error in judgment can be distinguished from Type-I and 
Type-II errors. Type-I error is where the court concludes that a 
conduct is illegal where it is not; Type-I I error is the conclusion 
that a conduct is not illegal where it is. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1051 
(1985); see also CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, LAW AND 
PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND ApPLICATION 183-84 (2d ed. 1994). 
281 See CALABRESI, supra note 275, at 6. 
282 See id. at 2. 
283 See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW95 (1977), cited in 
CALABRESI, supra note 275. 
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The American judge, therefore, is at a loss if required 
to interpret these bad laws as the civil-law counterpart 
would a civil code.284 This is especially so where the laws 
also suffer from Judge Calabresi's syndrome of legal 
obsolescence, where "[ c ]hanged circumstances, or newer 
statutory and common law developments, render[] some 
statutes inconsistent with a new social or legal 
topography. "285 In those situations, the judge is confronted 
with a law that is so outdated as to make its application 
irresponsible and unjust. A bad and unjust law, thus, is 
one whose legislative purpose is undermined by gaps in 
drafting and changes in social circumstances. What then 
is ajudge to do, as the common-law tradition requires the 
judge "to think of the law as functional, as responsive to 
current needs and current majorities, and as abhorring 
discriminations, special treatments, and inconsistencies not 
required by current majorities?"286 
Judge Calabresi is right in advocating a solution 
through a judicial-legislative balance, with which the court's 
role is "no more and no less than the critical task of deciding 
284 See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 225, 235 (1999)("[T]he kind of statute undergirding 
the civilian attitude, the Code Civile, [for exampe], has 
characteristics that support the more distinctly separated judicial 
and legislative role characteristic of western European legal 
systems"). As noted earlier, European codes: 
[E]merge in a single legislative act, after exquisite 
intellectual consideration, as an integrated whole. They 
are rarely if ever amended; and if amended, on Iy after 
equivalent study and attention to the integrated effects 
of change. A cohesive, comprehensive, enduring text, 
not easily changed in any forum, the Code Civile, say 
our Restatements - invites scholarly explication and 
judicial modesty. 
Id. This type of code hardly needs a rigorous examination of its 
political history for a proper interpretation, because such history 
is either evident in the text or can be gleaned without the help of 
the legislature. 
285 CALABRESI, supra note 275 at 6. 
2861d.; see also HELEN SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 79-125 (1968). 
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when a retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately 
applied to an existing statutory or common law rule. "287 
Although it may be tenuous to advocate Judge Calabresi' s 
version of judicial activism,288 it is enough to note that 
judicial activism in a bad-law situation must not violate the 
judicial-legislative balance. Because a bad law is one which 
undermines justice, "liquidating" and "fixing" such a law 
involves ajudicious application of the law, not Justice 
Scalia's textual imperialism over legislative will. The judge's 
role, even in an era of codes, must go beyond textual 
idolatry, to include the judicial safeguard of justice and 
liberty for all. 
By examining the law's history, thejudge aims at 
"majoritarian" justice, and avoids the constitutional difficulty 
of imposing independent will and force on legislative 
intentions - Hamilton's hope.289 Moreover, where the 
legislative intentions are oppressive and unresponsive to 
current constitutional notions of justice and liberty, the law 
, must be presumed unconstitutional. Notice that this 
judicial-legislative balance does not translate into the 
merger of the judiciary and the legislature, but into a dynamic 
relationship that projects our cherished system of checks 
and balances.29o Indeed, the judiciary merges with the 
legislature where the judge imposes an independent intent 
without regards to legislative due process. The judge, by 
not paying attention to legislative intent or purpose, but by 
applying the law according to individual understanding and 
will, becomes a default legislator. We must, therefore, 
formulate any approach to statutory construction with the 
above in mind. 
287 CALABRESI, supra note 275, at 164-65 (emphasis in original), 
B. Contextual Activism as a Practical-Reasoning 
Alternative to Textualism 
Judicial activism done within the context oflegislative 
supremacy and legal pragmatism is what I call contextual 
activism. The judge's job is to "judge." The art of 
')udging" requires the employment of those techniques that 
lead to a practical solution to any issue at stake. It should 
not matter whether the judge uses legislative history, simply 
looks at statutory amendments, or examines a text in 
harmony with other provisions, so long as the focus is on 
avoiding a nonsensical construction. The best approach 
must consult any source that would shed light on an 
ambiguous text. Where it is necessary, the judge should 
fuse historical facts with textual aids. In other words, the 
judge should engage in what Professors Eskridge and 
Frickey call the "funnel of abstraction" or'''practical 
reasoning" method.29I With such an approach, the judge 
does not passively interpret a provision, but actively seeks 
a just and constitutional result. The result is ')ust" because 
it comports with what is already published as prohibited. 
It is constitutional because it does not stray from a legitimate 
legislative goal. 
Statutory construction should include an 
understanding and the use of a statute's background in 
interpreting its text.292 While recognizing the primal nature 
of statutory text, the interpreter should apply historical 
factors to accentuate the textual language. The text, usually, 
must be the starting point, whereby one considers a 
problematic text in the context of the whole statutory 
scheme.293 That statutory scheme, in turn, should be 
understood by a look at the historical undertones of the 
statute's enactment; generally, this should involve the 
cautious use oflegislative history to discern the statute's 
purpose.294 Where there are more than on~ possible 
purpose, it is important to study them contemporaneously, 
288 See id. at 163-66 (arguing that judges should be allowed to 291 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 353. 
overrule a problematic statute, especially when such is not in 
synchrony with modem times). 292 See id. at 353-62. 
289 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), 29J See id. at 354-55. 
290 See CALABRESI, supra note 275, at 164. 294 See id. at 356,358. 
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and to see how they work together to give meaning to the 
text. With a "smoking-gun" legislative history,295 ifnot 
planted to derail the focus of the statute to where a loser 
legislator or lobbyist wants it, the judge's job is dramatically 
reduced. The judge should also examine those evolutive 
factors as to understand how changed circumstances affect 
the statutory meaning. 
Instead of Professors Eskridge and Frickey's 
emphasis on a hierarchical consideration of these contextual 
factors,296 however, the contextually active judge focuses 
more on the harmony among the relevant factors; apart 
from the statutory text, no one factor is more important 
than the other. Moreover, the level of inquiry into these 
factors must not go as deep as to transform the context 
into the law. Additionally, unlike what Professors Eskridge 
and Frickey suggest in their practical-reasoning method,297 
the contextual activist need not engage in Judge Posner's 
imaginative reconstruction. Such imaginative reconstruction 
permits the judge to impute an individual legislative 
amateurism into the interpretive process. This is an attempt 
at lawmaking, to which the textualist objection is 
warranted. The relevant notion, instead, is to have a 
sufficient background for understanding a text. There is 
no need for a "psychic" reconstruction of defunct 
congressional thought-process. 
While one may find context in legislative records, 
such records must be used with caution. A statutory 
context must not overshadow the text. Legislative history, 
while an appropriate context, is not the law. To over-
emphasize this history is to stand a chance oflosing sight 
of the actual law that went through the enactment process. 
Thus, contextual activism does not mean the unbounded 
resort to legislative history. As it rejects the vacuous and 
mindless dependence on text, so does it denounce the 
irresponsible reliance on the scattered verses oflegislators. 
Statutory interpretation, instead, is 'judging," an endeavor 
that must be based on judicial sensibilities, and aim at legal 
practicability. 
295 See id. at 356. 
296 See id. at 353-54. 
291 See id. at 356-57. 
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C. The Maryland Approach as an Example of 
Contextual Activism 
It has been argued that there is no difference between 
the Supreme Court and state courts in how they approach 
the interpretation of statutes. 298 According to Judge Abner 
J. Mikva and Professor Eric Lane, "approaches to 
statutory interpretation are not divisible into 'state' and 
'federal.' Differences in interpretative approaches are the 
product of individual judicial sensibilities and not, for the 
most part, particular jurisdictions."299 Along this line, 
Professor Lane further contends that state courts are not 
unique in their application of common-law techniques in 
construing statutes.300 In his views, federal courts, like 
state courts, use the common law to fill the gaps in 
statutes.3ot Because judges, whether "federal" or "state," 
must "decide" cases, the common law is an inevitable 
technique on both benches, not one restricted to the state 
bench.302 Instead of jurisdictional differences, factors that 
determine whether a judge will impose his or her individual 
will on a statute inel ude the statute's clarity, the intensity of 
the individual will, and the judge's sense of responsibility 
towards statutes in generaP03 
The views above are partially right. While it may be 
right that "individual judicial sensibilities" account for a large 
part of a judicial decision, differences in the political 
dynamics of the two jurisdictions may control such 
sensibilities differently. Thus, the tune of the common-law 
technique applied may derive from jurisdictional 
sensibilities. In state courts, for example, the electoral or 
republican nature of the relationship between courts and 
citizens may require judges to employ a more pragmatic 
approach to statutory interpretation. Thus, the state judge's 
sense of responsibility towards a statute may be more 
298 See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 5\, at 3-4. 
299/d. 
JOQ See Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response 
to Judge Kaye and Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 87 (\999). 
301 See id. 
J02 See id. 
303 See id. 
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judicious and less detached than found in a one-tracked 
approach as in textualism. Because the politics of selecting 
federal judges differ from that of state judges, the aggregate 
make-up of individual judicial sensibilities may be different 
for both benches. Moreover, judicial sensibilities derive 
considerably from individual ideological or political 
persuasions. Regardless of the reasons, there should be 
no serious dispute over whether there are certain 
differences between the Supreme Court and state courts 
in their approaches to statutory construction. Take the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, for example. 
Maryland's approach is a classic example of 
contextual activism, far from the Supreme Court's 
inconsistent homage to legislative context. Like several 
state high courts, the Maryland Court of Appeals relies 
primarily on the legislative context of a statute for the 
meaning of its text. The focus is on avoiding an 
interpretation that would lead to absurd results, because 
such results could not have been the intent of the enacting 
legislature. Judge Wilner's articulation of the Maryland 
approach is an excellent description of contextual activism. 
Thus: 
[I]n construing a statute, [the] objective is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature. Ifthe language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous and expresses a 
meaning consistent with the statute's goals and 
apparent purpose, our inquiry normally ends 
with that language. If, on the other hand, the 
language is susceptible to more than one meaning 
and is therefore ambiguous, we consider not 
only the literal or usual meaning of the words, 
but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, 
the objectives and purpose of the enactment, 
and, in those circumstances, in seeking to 
ascertain legislative intent, we consider the 
consequences resulting from one meaning 
rather than another, and adopt that construction 
which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, 
or one which is inconsistent with common 
sense.304 
304 Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of 
Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135,747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000)( citations omitted). 
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Maryland courts have variously relied on what they 
call "the cardinal rule of statutory construction" - to 
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. This 
cardinal rule, I argue, does not usually operate beyond 
what should be called "the papal rule of statutory 
construction" - that courts must not effectuate that 
expression of intent that is inconsistent with common sense, 
or leads to absurd results. In performing this function, 
cOlU1s must start with the text of a statute. Logically, where 
the text is plain and unambiguous in its expression of the 
legislative intent, there is no need to continue the inquiry. 
The problem, however, is that the judge who ignores 
context, or who is quick to fmd plain text, is at a high risk 
of not effectuating the intent of the legislature. Such a 
judge is one who also thinks that the intent of the law is 
different from that of the legislature; a position that is 
conducive for ')udicial freewheeling." 
Although I have noted earlier that legislative intent 
may be difficult to discern, the court can use the statute's 
purpose as a basis for understanding such intent. In 
ascertaining intent, the judge must note that the members 
of a legislature are rational people, and, therefore, would 
not intend an absurd result, but one that comports with 
common sense. This is precisely what the Maryland high 
court does with great consistency and efficiency. 
Regardless of how recent Maryland began keeping 
legislative record, the Maryland Court of Appeals has done 
well in tracing the legislative history of a statute, and in 
discerning the intent of a particular provision. Certain 
factors may account for this efficiency, and for the state 
court's better use oflegislative context than done by the 
Supreme Court. For one thing, as compared to Congress, 
state legislatures are more unified in their goals and intent. 
Although local constituencies in state legislatures may 
approximate the diversity found in Congress, state 
lawmakers, on the whole, seem to have fewer distracters 
to confront. It is one tIring for Baltimore City to compete 
for legislative attention against another Maryland COlUlty, 
it is quite another for Maryland to go against states like 
California, Texas and Florida in Congress. The members 
of Congress simply have more diversified interests 
competing for their attention.305 Therefore, it may be more 
305 See KINGDON, supra note 138. 
difficult to ascertain congressional intent than it is to 
ascertain the intent of a state legislature.306 
Whatever may be the reason, Maryland courts have 
consistently followed the rule stated by Judge Wilner in 
Chesapeake Charter. The state high court seems to have 
done this in all of the 163 cases that this author reviewed. 
While the court emphasized certain aspects of the rule in 
some cases, it never strayed from the rule in all of the 
cases. In some cases, the court seemed to emphasize the 
clarity of a text; and, in other situations, it dwelt on 
legislative context. The logic of this differential emphasis 
is precisely why courts cannot depend on anyone principle 
of interpretation to attack a statutory problem. The issue 
in a case must depend on the particular circumstance. 
While a statute may present a problem of serious textual 
an1biguity, another statute may implicate such absurdity 
questions as to require a reliance on legislative history. 
Either way, the focus must remain on discerning and 
effectuating that legislative intent that is consistent with the 
particular circumstances. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland reiterated this approach in Sacchet v. Elan.307 
The issue in Elan was whether "manslaughter by 
automobile" should be classified as a "crin1e of violence," 
for the purpose of determining the rate to be applied in 
calculating an inmate's good-conduct credits.308 Section 
700 (d) of Article 27 of the Matyland Annotated Code is 
the statutory authority under which the Division of 
Correction ("D.O.C.") awards good-conduct credits to 
an inmate, which generally results in an earlier release of 
the inmate.309 In calculating these credits, this section 
differentiates between crimes of violence and other 
crimes.3iO While those convicted of violent crimes are 
awarded credits at a rate of five days per month, other 
306 See supra Part III (D). 
307 353 Md. 87, 724 A.2d 667 (1999). 
308 See id. at 92,724 A.2d at 669. 
309 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (1997 & 1998 Supp.). 
310 See id., § 700( d)(2)&(3). 
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convicts receive ten days per month.311 In Elan, the 
defendant was convicted of manslaughter by automobile.312 
The question, therefore, was whether this crime was a 
crime of violence, as to deserve five, instead often, days 
per month in good-conduct credits.313 Section 643B(a) 
of Article 27 lists which crin1es are considered crimes of 
violence.314 Under this section, manslaughter, except 
involuntary manslaughter, is a crime of violence.315 
However, there is no indication as to whether manslaughter 
by automobile is such a crin1e,316 since this crin1e is different 
from those enumerated in Section 64 3B( a) in that it does 
not require proof of intent but simply proof of gross 
negligence.317 
The parties' arguments derived considerably from 
their search for legislative intent in the textual amendments 
to Section 643B(a).318 In the State's views, the legislative 
intent of this section, as it concerns automobile 
manslaughter, is evident in the phrase "manslaughter, except 
involuntary manslaughter. "319 By this phrase, according 
to the State, the General Assembly intended to categorize 
as crimes of violence all forms of manslaughter except 
common-law involuntary manslaughter.31o This conclusion 
was warranted, the State contended, because if the 
legislature had meant to include only common-law 
voluntary manslaughter, it could have specifically done so 
by using a different phrase from "manslaughter, except 
311 See id. 
312 See Sian, 353 Md. at 88, 724 A.2d at 667-68. 
313 See id. at 92,724 A.2d at 669. 
314 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643S(a) (1997 & 1998 Supp.). 
315 See id. 
316 See id. 
317 See id. at § 388. 
318 See Sian, 353 Md. at 93-95,724 A.2d at 669-70. 
319 See id. at 93,724 A.2d at 669. 
320 See id. 
30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 37 
Articles 
involuntary manslaughter."32I The inmate, Blan, argued, 
in contrast, that this phrase actually expressed the 
legislature's intent to focus on only the two common-law 
forms of manslaughter - voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter. 322 Otherwise, the legislature would have 
expressly mentioned manslaughter by automobile, 
especially having amended other phrases in the same 
subsection, with a view to clarifying the list of crimes of 
violence.323 
The court of special appeals found Blan's argument 
persuasive, basing its ruling upon the failure of the General 
Assembly to amend the subsection as suggested, despite 
the past opportunities.324 The court of appeals, however, 
went beyond this point, noting that the answer to the issue 
did not lie in either "any supposed plain meaning of the 
phrase 'manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter' . 
.. [or] in any purported inaction with respect to the same 
language by successive Legislatures."325 This is because 
each of these two factors is amenable to different, but 
equally, plausible interpretations, "if all we look to is the 
single, contested phrase as if in a vacuum. "326 Therefore, 
"viewing statutory language in isolation is a method of 
construction which this Court eschews."327 Instead, the 
court would "examine the language of the statute in the 
context in which it was adopted, and consider the general 
purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. "328 In other 
words, the court would apply practical reasoning in looking 
beyond the text of a statute, especially with a view to 
321 See id. 724 A.2d at 669-70. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
324 See id. at 94,724 A.2d at 670. 
325 Jd. at 95,724 A.2d at 670. 
326 Jd., 724 A.2d at 671. 
327 Jd. (citing Jnre Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d427, 430 
(1994); Kaczorowski v. City of8altimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 
A.2d 628, 632-33 (J 987)). 
328Jd. (citations omitted). 
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understanding such text within the context oflegislative 
intent and purpose, instead of finding that intent and 
purpose in the unclear text. 
The court, upon rejecting the parties' overemphasis 
on the statutory text, began addressing the issue by 
examining the nature of the crimes categorized as crimes 
of violence under Section 643B(a).329 One distinguishing 
factor between those crimes and automobile manslaughter, 
the court noted, is that, unlike the former which required 
proof of criminal intent, the latter required only proof of 
gross negligence.330 The latter, in fact, is an offense 
committed while the offender is doing a lawful thing in an 
unlawful manner, compared to the crimes listed in Section 
643B(a), which are culpable acts in themselves.331 The 
only crime mentioned in this section that does not require 
criminal intent, the court continued, is involuntary 
manslaughter, which is expressly excluded from crimes of 
violence.332 The court found it anomalous, therefore, that 
the legislature would include a crime that does not require 
criminal intent in the same category as those reqUiring intent 
as all crimes of violence, and, at the same time, except 
another crime - involuntary manslaughter- that also does 
not require intent. 333 TillS anomaly it found to negate "the 
prerogati ve and practice ... to avoid interpretation of a 
statute that effects an unreasonable or illogical result or 
one that is inconsistent with common sense."334 
The court next looked at the fact that Section 64 3B( a) 
also includes as a crime of violence an attempt at 
committing any of the listed offenses.335 According to the 
court, there is no such crime as attempted manslaughter 
329 See id. 
lJO See id. 
lJl See id. at 96,724 A.2d at 671. 
J32 See id 
J33 See id. 
3341d. (citing Condon v. State, 332 Md.481, 91-91, 632A.2d 753, 
758 (J 993); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 149,395 A.2d 464, 474 
(1978)). 
J35 See id (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 6438(a)). 
by automobile, because an attempt requires a criminal 
intent, and involuntary manslaughter only requires that the 
offender be grossly negligent in operating an automobile.336 
In the court's view, therefore, inclusion of this crime in the 
violent category would amount to recognizing a non-
offense as in attempted manslaughter by automobile.337 
Such absurdity the court was not willing to support. To 
buttress its point, the court referred to the history of the 
statute.338 It noted that at the time the legislature enacted 
Section 643B, Section 388 (dealing with automobile 
manslaughter) was already in force. 339 In fact, it was then 
a misdemeanor, which carried a three-year maximum 
sentence.340 At this same time, meanwhile, involuntary 
manslaughter carried a ten-year sentence.341 It would not, 
as such, make any sense that the legislature intended to 
treat automobile manslaughter more harshly than 
involuntary manslaughter.342 For the foregoing reasons, 
the court concluded that automobile manslaughter is not a 
crime ofviolence.343 
The beauty of the court's approach in Blan is its 
practical reasoning, far from the vacuous manipulation of 
an unclear text. The aim is at a sensible execution ofa 
legislative intent, an intent that is better understood within 
the context of the statute's enactment. While the court in 
Elan did not need to rely on such legislative records as 
committee reports and floor statements, its extrication of 
the statute's legislative intent revolved around the practical 
application of the provision in question. The court was 
not sheepish in its examination of the text. Even with such 
a whole-act approach, the primary focus was not 
))6 See id. at 97, 724 A.2d at 671. 
337 See id., 724 A .2d at 671-72. 
338 See id. 
339 See id., 724 A.2d at 672. 
340 See id. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. at 97-98,724 A.2d at 672. 
343 See id. at 98,724 A.2d at 673. 
Articles 
necessarily on how the legislature used the unclear text in 
other parts of the statute, but on the consistency and 
uniformity of the legislature's enacting goals. This approach 
is a middle ground between the hardened prisoner of texts 
and the untamed addict to legislative history. Where a 
textualist would necessarily end the inquiry with the phrase 
"manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter," and the 
legislative historian would readily find solace in committee 
reports, the contextual interpreter focuses mainly on 
avoiding that interpretation that leads to an unreasonable 
or absurd result. This, as indicated earlier, should be the 
foundation upon which the court's activism must rest. To 
be sure, the mere examination of the overall nature of a 
statute is not enough to excuse a court from judicial 
passivity .344 The court must choose that interpretation that 
comports with common sense and justice. Unlike Justice 
Scalia's textualist approach, and his result-oriented 
utilization of the whole-act rule, the Mary land high court 
would not hesitate to employ any means that would render 
an intelligible and a practicable result. This is contextual 
activism. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Statutory construction is an art - a judicial art. It 
requires judges to interpret the words of others - the words 
of politicians, or at least of those who work for politicians. 
These words are sometimes not clear even to the most 
studious interpreter. Although statutes are deliberate legal 
documents, they are also political products, often with holes 
left by the enacting legislatures' inability to address every 
related concern in the statutes. As such, they are bound 
to contain unclear language. In a system where statutes 
are primarily recitations oflegislative responses to practical 
problems, and those responses are molded by logistical 
compromises by legislators, it is not surprising that courts 
would commonly encounter ambiguous statutory 
344 See generally Brogan, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)( examining the 
general nature of 18 U .S.C. § 1001, but reaching a passive and an 
absurd result). Note that while the approach to Section 643B(a) of 
the Maryland Code avoided the denial of a statutorily granted 
right, Brogan's vacuous interpretation of § 1001 demeaned the 
constitutional right to due process. 
30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 39 
Articles 
provisions. In interpreting these provisions, the ultimate 
goal should indeed be the avoidance of a meaning that 
leads to absurdity. The objective is to abide by the 
constitutional doctrine of separating the judiciary from the 
legislature. This objective is hard to achieve without one 
branch understanding what, why and how the other carries 
out its functions. 
The idea that statutory construction should be confined 
to a statute's text is shortsighted and inadequate for what 
is required in a democratic system that draws a lot from 
the common law. Although statutes are supreme in today' s 
constitutional democracy, they do not exist in a vacuum. 
They are created within the political context of the problems 
they address; they express well-debated public policies. 
When the statutory interpreter goes outside this debate, 
there is an increased chance that she creates a different 
debate, which eventually results in tackling the wrong 
problem (or the right problem with the wrong approach). 
Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory 
construction is faulty on many grounds. The main problem 
is that it marginalizes the importance of context, and ignores 
the fact that this context is crucial to justice. Even when it 
relies on context, it chooses the wrong one. Its criticism 
of purposivism and intentional ism as relying on legislative 
history and falling into the trap of'judicial freewheeling" is 
myopic. To the contrary, textualism presents a more 
serious danger of'judicial freewheeling," because when a 
judge uses devices that are alien to a statute's creation, 
there is a high likelihood that judicial opinions will become 
result-oriented. Justice Scalia's own practices buttresses 
this point, especially as they show that his textual ism is a 
convenient tool for conserving and masking his political 
ideology. 
The best approach to statutory construction is that 
employed by several state courts - what I have referred 
to as contextual activism. Because statutes tackle practical 
problems, they must be interpreted with a practical-
reasoning approach. The issue is not whether the judge 
must consult legislative history, but whether this history 
can furnish sufficient context to the statutory text so that 
the judge's interpretation would not lead to an absurd 
result. While legislative records are not authoritative 
sources of law, their cautious use presents a complete 
picture. This approach is necessary in light of the American 
common-law tradition, the skeletal nature of American 
30.2 U. Bait L.F. 40 
codes, and the constitutional primacy of respecting the 
legislature's authority. Moreover, law, in a democracy, 
must not maintain an independent existence, but must live 
or die by its purpose. 
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